Spinoza's Ethics: II.A1: Human Essence

This first axiom of Book II is quite dissimilar to the axioms of Book I. Those axioms were basically logical building blocks. This axiom does not operate as a simple logical concept. In fact, it could be even be a proposition derived by geometric reasoning from the propositions in Book I. So, given Spinoza's rigor and brevity, this axiom and the definitions allow Book II to stand on its own grounding separate from but within the context of Book I.

Hominis essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam hoc est ex naturæ ordine tam fieri potest ut hic et ille homo existat quam ut non existat.

Translated as,

The essence of a human does not involve necessary existence, that is, from the order of nature it can occur that this and that human might exist as much as this and that human might not exist.

Spinoza's Ethics: II. D7: Singular Things

Singular things are made up of parts and parts are made up of parts. For that reason, Spinoza needs to address a way to discuss singular things in order to address cause and effect. As reality is infinitely complex, he sets up a principle that allows him to discuss a "singularity" in which the coordinated function of parts is apparent. This is truly definitional.

Per res singulares intelligo res quæ finitæ sunt et determinatam habent existentiam. Quod si plura individua in una actione ita concurrant ut omnia simul unius effectus sint causa, eadem omnia eatenus ut unam rem singularem considero.

Translated as,

By singular things I understand things which are finite and have determinate existence. But if more individuals occur in one action so that all things might be the cause of one effect, I consider all these same things as though they are one singular thing.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.D6: Perfection

Such a small sentence, such a huge statement. Several aspects of this definition are interesting. First, Spinoza makes it a definition. He could have simply worked it out as a proposition derived from the developments of Book I by a statement that it is all God, God is reality and God is perfect and therefore reality is perfect. But he didn't. He sets it as a definition because he wishes to work from the angle of the human mind and perspectival illusions (such as what is perfect for my interests is perfect for the universe) in Book II. Second, the implications are huge. Essentially the universe is "an open book test." The answers are simply in front of us, not in our self-derived notions of perfection or excellence. Third, he is using the verb intelligo or "understand" rather the "conceive" or "perceive." It appears that this verb of understanding is to assist in defining terms.

Per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo.

Translated as,

By reality and perfection I understand as the same thing.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.D5: Duration

Spinoza is beginning to establish an important aspect of existence of a mind or a body - its characterization by duration. Duration is not determined internally, because the nature of a mode is to go into and out of existence. Only substance whose essence is existence is not subject to duration.The continued existence of a mode is subject to a necessary causal chain - the same chain which brings a mode into existence also removes it from existence.

Spinoza is careful to highlight this as a condition of existing. Modes are subject to duration insofar as they exist. When modes do not exist, modes still an essence. As such, modes have an essence which is not subject to duration. When the essence of a mode begins to exist, the virtual becomes real. When that mode ceases to exist, then the real becomes virtual. 

Duratio est indefinita existendi continuatio.

Explicatio: Dico indefinitam quia per ipsam rei existentis naturam determinari nequaquam potest neque etiam a causa efficiente quæ scilicet rei existentiam necessario ponit, non autem tollit.

Translated as,

Duration is the indefinite continuation of existing.

Explanation: I say indefinite [continuation] because [the continuation] is not at all able to be determined by the nature of its own existence and moreover [the continuation] also does not come from the efficient cause which of course made the existence of the thing by necessity.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.D4: Adequate Idea

This is an extremely important distinction and one which is difficult to gain. Spinoza is discussing a framework of two accessible attributes: thinking and extending. These attributes are perspectival and reflect independent views or aspects of the same reality. However, human finite capacities and mental tendencies cause them to be seen as causing one another rather than simultaneously reflecting the same underlying reality. 

As a result, ideas tend to be inadequate because they are either poorly constructed (such as illogical) or because they are derivatively rooted in perceptions of the object rather than fundamentally rooted in a causal chain of adequate ideas of underlying reality. Adequate ideas are concepts of the active mind (II.D3) because they connect with expressiveness, whereas inadequate ideas (even though scientifically tested of objects) cause a passive mind as inert reflections of an expressive mode within another attribute (namely that of extending). The result is a loss of power for the mind (active to passive) as its ideas are grounded in a mirroring of extending rather than rooted in the reality of substance. This difficult distinction is important to the achievement of blessedness as that state is one which reflects power. Essentially for Spinoza, unhappiness is a thinking problem based on inadequate ideas.

Per ideam adæquatam intelligo ideam quæ quatenus in se sine relatione ad objectum consideratur, omnes veræ ideæ proprietates sive denominationes intrinsecas habet.

Explicatio: Dico intrinsecas ut illam secludam quæ extrinseca est nempe convenientiam ideæ cum suo ideato.

Translated as,

By adequate idea, I understand an idea which insofar as it [the idea] is considered in itself and without relation to an object, has all of the properties and intrinsic denominations of a true idea.

Explanation: I say intrinsic [denominations] so that I might shut off the idea's conformity, which of course is [an] extrinsic [denomination], with that of which it is the idea.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.D3: Idea

Spinoza moves first to a definition of idea to focus on what a mind does - it is a thinking thing, a mode, and its modal expression is the formation of ideas. The idea is formed as a concept of the mind as by the mind's action or power, not as a passive impression by an object. If the mind were passive to objects, the attribute of thinking would simply be a subset of the attribute of extending. To be separate but equal within substance, both attributes need to independently express the essence of substance.

This separation between object and idea seems foreign. Spinoza is not completely separating idea from object, because both idea and object are deeply connected through the mode itself that gives rise to them. The mode itself which expresses itself through either its extending aspect or its thinking aspect.

An example from childhood might make this "separate but equal but still the same in reality" more clear. Occasionally children discuss the relative merits of seeing versus hearing. Each aspect of gathering sensory data has its own characteristics. Neither informs the other in a dominant way. They are separate but equal in gathering information differently about the same underlying reality. 

The emphasis on action or power of the mind not only maintaining the unitary operation of God's expressive force within both attributes of thinking (IID3) and extending (IID1) but also holds significant implications for blessedness as the Ethics unfolds.

Given this unitary structure of Spinoza (in contrast to Descartes' dualism), consider the contrast to II.D1. There, the body is a mode under the aspect of extending. Here, the mind is similarly a mode under the aspect of thinking. So, if the mind forms ideas under the fact that it is a thinking thing, what does the body do under the fact that it is an extending thing? It attempts to persevere and extend its existence.

Thinking is different than Knowing in the same way as extending is different than Being or Existing. Thinking and extending are simply perspectival attributes and mode-based. Knowing and Being are conceptual and substance-based. This distinction of conceiving versus perceiving has held since ID4. The mind referred to here is not the operation of individual human minds, but mind as modal expression of the attribute of thinking.

Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum quem mens format propterea quod res est cogitans.

Explicatio: Dico potius conceptum quam perceptionem quia perceptionis nomen indicare videtur mentem ab objecto pati. At conceptus actionem mentis exprimere videtur.

Translated as,

By idea, I understand a concept of the mind which the mind forms on account of the fact that the thing [mind] is [a] thinking [thing].

Explanation: I say concept rather than a perception because the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is acted on by an object. But concept seems to express an action of the mind.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.D2: Essence As Singular

This definition builds off of "essence," a term that may be contrasted with "existence." At the beginning of the Ethics, Spinoza focuses on "essence" in defining self-caused as that whose essence involves existence. Here it pertains to the essence of the self-caused thing (God) to have (an item of) existence. Existence cannot be removed without removing God and vice versa. As the Ethics develops, a distinction is made between substance, where essence and existence are joined, and modes, where essence is permanent but existence is temporary. This definition applies equally to substance and modes and seems almost to qualify an an axiom.

Due to potential errors in understanding, I have translated id as "item" rather than "it." In a Platonic sense, Spinoza focuses on id or "item" that is essential to the definition of res or "thing." But this is not as Platonic as it appears because each res or "thing" is singular. For example, infinite squares may be drawn within a given circle. To define a specific square within that circle means to define the essence of the specific square as different than the other infinite possible squares within that circle. The differentiating items - the collection of four dots on the circle - are a group. This unique group or "item" is key to the specific square. Likewise, to identify the unique group of dots or "item" requires the square. In this way, the id or "item" that pertains to the essence of the res or "thing" is very particular and forces the articulation of the vice versa phrase in which the id or "item" is described as equally dependent on the res or "thing." This articulation may seem redundant because there is slight difference between the id or "item" and the res or "thing." 

It appears that Spinoza puts this definition early in the second section of the Ethics because of the general mental tendency towards abstraction. Rather than defining essence as a generalizing function, defining essence becomes rooted in the identification of specifics.

Ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertinere dico quo dato res necessario ponitur et quo sublato res necessario tollitur; vel id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.

Translated as,

I say that an item pertains to the essence of some thing in which the item is provided, the thing necessarily exists and in which the item is removed, the thing is necessarily removed; or that item without which, the thing is able to neither be nor be conceived and, vice versa, that item, without which thing, is able to neither be nor be conceived.