Spinoza's Ethics: II.P47

Mens humana adæquatam habet cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei.

The human mind has an adequate understanding of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens humana ideas habet (per propositionem 22 hujus) ex quibus (per propositionem 23 hujus) se suumque corpus (per propositionem 19 hujus) et (per corollarium I propositionis 16 et per propositionem 17 hujus) corpora externa ut actu existentia percipit adeoque (per propositiones 45 et 46 hujus) cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei habet adæquatam. Q.E.D.

The human mind has ideas (by IIP22) out of which (by IIP23) it perceives itself and its body (by IIP19) and (by IP16C and IIP17) external bodies as actually existing to such an extent (by IIP45 and 46) it has an adequate understanding of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc videmus Dei infinitam essentiam ejusque æternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere quæ adæquate cognoscamus atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare de quo diximus in scholio II propositionis 40 hujus partis et de cujus præstantia et utilitate in quinta parte erit nobis dicendi locus. Quod autem homines non æque claram Dei ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora et quod nomen "Deus" junxerunt imaginibus rerum quas videre solent; quod homines vix vitare possunt quia continuo a corporibus externis afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait lineas quæ ex centro circuli ad ejusdem circumferentiam ducuntur esse inæquales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit quam mathematici. Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare quem nuper audivi clamantem suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur. Atque hinc pleræque oriuntur controversiæ nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur. Nam revera dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant ita ut quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.

From here we see that the infinite essence of God and its eternity is known by everything. Since moreover everything is in God and conceived through God, it follows that we from this understanding are able to deduce more things which we know adequately and to such an extent form that third kind of knowledge about which we said in II40S2 and about its excellence and utility in the fifth part will be a place for us to discuss. Moreover, because people do not equally have a clear understanding of God and common notions, from there it happens that they deny that God is imagined as bodies and what name God they have joined by images of things which they are accustomed to see; because people are scarcely able to avoid since they are continually affected by external bodies. And assuredly they maintain the majority of errors in this alone because obviously we do not apply names to things correctly. For when someone says lines which lead from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, that person understands something then through the circle than mathematics. Thus, when people err in calculation, they have other numbers in mind, others on paper. Thus, if you look at the mind of them, they do not err clearly; nevertheless they seem to err because we think they have the numbers themselves in mind which are on the paper. If this is not so, we might believe nothing that the same err; so that I did not believe whomever erred that recently I heard shouting that his courtyard had flown into his neighbor's hen because of course the thought of it seemed clear enough to me. And from here many more controversies have arisen certainly because people do not explain their mind clearly or because one mind interpret another poorly. For actually as long as they contradict themselves greatly or think the same thing or different things so much that they think those who err in another are absurd, are not.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P48

In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum.

In the mind no will is absolute or free but the mind is determined to willing this or that by a cause which also has been determined by something else and again this from another and thus into infinity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (per propositionem 11 hujus) adeoque (per corollarium II propositionis 17 partis I) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera sive absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (per propositionem 28 partis I) determinari debet a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia etc. Q.E.D.

The mind is a certain and determined mode for knowing (by IIP11) to such a degree (by IP17IIC) is not able to be a free cause of its own actions or is not able to have an absolute faculty for willing or not willing but for willing this or that (by IP28) it ought to be determined from a cause which has also been determined from another and this again from another etc.

SCHOLIUM: Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc. Unde sequitur has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias vel nihil esse præter entia metaphysica vel universalia quæ ex particularibus formare solemus. Adeo ut intellectus et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem cur homines se liberos esse putent explicuimus in appendice partis primæ. Verum antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem inquam intelligo qua mens quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat et non cupiditatem qua mens res appetit vel aversatur. At postquam demonstravimus has facultates notiones esse universales quæ a singularibus ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum jam est an ipsæ volitiones aliquid sint præter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum inquam est an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur præter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide sequentem propositionem ut et demonstrationem 3 hujus ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines quales in fundo oculi et si placet, in medio cerebro formantur sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.

In this same way it is demonstrated in the mind there is no absolute faculty for understanding, desiring, loving etc. From which it follows that these and similar faculties are actually fictions are either nothing but metaphysical or universal entities which we are are accustomed to form from particulars. To such a degree the intellect and will hold themselves in the same way to this and that idea or to this and that volition and as stoneness is to this and that stone or as humanness is to Peter and Paul. Moreover we have explained the cause why humans think themselves to be free in the appendix of the first part. Indeed before I travel further, let it be noted here that by will I understand the faculty of affirming and denying, not desiring moreover; I say that I understand the faculty by which the mind has that is true or what is false, affirms or denies and not the desire by what thing the mind desires or is repelled. But after we have shown these faculties are universal notions which are not distinct from the singular things from which we form them, we now are inquiring whether the volitions themselves are something beyond the ideas of the things themselves. I say inquiring is either in the mind by some affirmation and negation given except that which is an idea involves insofar as an idea - see following proposition and D3 lest the thinking of this fall into pictures. For I do not understand by ideas such images which in base of the eyes if it pleases, it is formed in the middle of the brain but the concepts of understanding.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P46

Cognitio æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei quam unaquæque idea involvit, est adæquata et perfecta.

The knowledge of eternal and infinite essence of God which each and every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

DEMONSTRATIO: Demonstratio præcedentis propositionis universalis est et sive res ut pars sive ut totum consideretur, ejus idea sive totius sit sive partis (per propositionem præcedentem) Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvet. Quare id quod cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei dat, omnibus commune et æque in parte ac in toto est adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus) erit hæc cognitio adæquata. Q.E.D.

The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal and whether the thing as part or as the whole is considered, its idea whether totally or partially (by IIP45) involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. Thus, that which gives the knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, by all things is commonly and equally in part and in the whole is to such a degree (by IIP38) will be this adequate knowledge.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P45

Unaquæque cujuscunque corporis vel rei singularis actu existentis idea Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit.

Each and every idea of whatsoever body or singular thing by means of the act of existence involves the eternal and infinite essence of God by necessity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea rei singularis actu existentis ipsius rei tam essentiam quam existentiam necessario involvit (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus). At res singulares (per propositionem 15 partis I) non possunt sine Deo concipi sed quia (per propositionem 6 hujus) Deum pro causa habent quatenus sub attributo consideratur cujus res ipsæ modi sunt, debent necessario earum ideæ (per axioma 4 partis I) ipsarum attributi conceptum hoc est (per definitionem 6 partis I) Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvere. Q.E.D.

The idea of a singular thing involves by necessity by the act of existing of the thing itself involves not only essence but existence as well.

SCHOLIUM: Hic per existentiam non intelligo durationem hoc est existentiam quatenus abstracte concipitur et tanquam quædam quantitatis species. Nam loquor de ipsa natura existentiæ quæ rebus singularibus tribuitur propterea quod ex æterna necessitate Dei naturæ infinita infinitis modis sequuntur (vide propositionem 16 partis I). Loquor inquam de ipsa existentia rerum singularium quatenus in Deo sunt. Nam etsi unaquæque ab alia re singulari determinetur ad certo modo existendum, vis tamen qua unaquæque in existendo perseverat, ex æterna necessitate naturæ Dei sequitur. Qua de re vide corollarium propositionis 24 partis I.

Here by existence I do not understand duration, that is existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly and so to speak, a certain kind of quantity. For I speak about the nature itself of existence which is divided by singular things thus that which follow from the eternal necessity of God by infinite nature in infinite modes (see IP16). I speak, I say concerning the existence itself of singular things insofar as they are in God. For as if each and every thing is determined by some singular thing for existing by a certain mode, nevertheless the power by which each and every thing perseveres in existence, it follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. Concerning which see IP24C.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P44

De natura rationis non est res ut contingentes sed ut necessarias contemplari.

Concerning the nature of reason it is not that it observes things as contingent but as necessary.

DEMONSTRATIO: De natura rationis est res vere percipere (per propositionem 41 hujus) nempe (per axioma 6 partis I) ut in se sunt hoc est (per propositionem 29 partis I) non ut contingentes sed ut necessarias. Q.E.D.

Demonstration: Concerning the nature of reason it is that it truly perceives things (by IIP41), namely (by IA6) that they are in themselves, that is (by IP29) not as contingent buy as necessary.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur a sola imaginatione pendere quod res tam respectu præteriti quam futuri ut contingentes contemplemur.

Corollary 1: From this it follows that it depends on the imagination alone that we observe things as contingent not only with respect to the past but also to the future.

SCHOLIUM: Qua autem ratione hoc fiat paucis explicabo. Ostendimus supra (propositione 17 hujus cum ejus corollario) mentem, quamvis res non existant, eas tamen semper ut sibi præsentes imaginari nisi causæ occurrant quæ earum præsentem existentiam secludant. Deinde (propositione 18 hujus) ostendimus quod si corpus humanum semel a duobus corporibus externis simul affectum fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur hoc est ambo ut sibi præsentia contemplabitur nisi causæ occurrant quæ eorum præsentem existentiam secludant. Præterea nemo dubitat quin etiam tempus imaginemur nempe ex eo quod corpora alia aliis tardius vel celerius vel æque celeriter moveri imaginemur. Ponamus itaque puerum qui heri prima vice hora matutina viderit Petrum, meridiana autem Paulum et vespertina Simeonem atque hodie iterum matutina hora Petrum. Ex propositione 18 hujus patet quod simulac matutinam lucem videt, illico solem eandem cæli quam die præcedenti viderit partem percurrentem sive diem integrum et simul cum tempore matutino Petrum, cum meridiano autem Paulum et cum vespertino Simeonem imaginabitur hoc est Pauli et Simeonis existentiam cum relatione ad futurum tempus imaginabitur et contra si hora vespertina Simeonem videat, Paulum et Petrum ad tempus præteritum referet, eosdem scilicet simul cum tempore præterito imaginando atque hæc eo constantius quo sæpius eos eodem hoc ordine viderit. Quod si aliquando contingat ut alia quadam vespera loco Simeonis Jacobum videat, tum sequenti mane cum tempore vespertino jam Simeonem jam Jacobum, non vero ambos simul imaginabitur. Nam alterutrum tantum, non autem ambos simul tempore vespertino vidisse supponitur. Fluctuabitur itaque ejus imaginatio et cum futuro tempore vespertino jam hunc jam illum imaginabitur hoc est neutrum certo sed utrumque contingenter futurum contemplabitur. Atque hæc imaginationis fluctuatio eadem erit si imaginatio rerum sit quas eodem modo cum relatione ad tempus præteritum vel præsens contemplamur et consequenter res tam ad tempus præsens quam ad præteritum vel futurum relatas ut contingentes imaginabimur.

Scholium: Moreover, I will with a few words by what way this happens. We have shown above (IIP7/C) the mind, although things do not exist, nevertheless always imagines things as if present to itself unless causes happen which exclude their present existence. Next (IIP18) we have shown that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, when the mind later imagines one of them, immediately remembers the other, that is observes both as present to itself unless causes occur which preclude their present existence. Meanwhile no one doubts that we do not also imagine time, namely that some bodies move more quickly than others, some more slowly and some equally quickly. Let us suppose that a boy who saw Peter yesterday morning, then Paul in midday and Simon in the evening and then Peter today in the morning. From IIP18, it is clear that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine the same sun in the spot of the sky which he saw a passing part on the preceding day or even more the whole day and at the same time Peter with the morning, then Paul with midday and Simon with evening, that is he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time and, in contrast, if he might see Simon in the evening, he might refer Paul and Peter to an earlier time, of course by imagining the same ones together with the earlier time and these things the more constantly the more often he will see them in this same order. Because if it happens some other time that he might see on another certain evening Jacob in place of Simon, then on the following morning he will imagine now Simon, now Jacob with the evening time, indeed not both together. For it is supposed that he has seen one of the two not both together at the evening time. Thus his imagination will fluctuate and will imagine now this now that with a future evening time, that is, he will observe neither as certain future but both as contingent. And this fluctuation of imagination will be the same if the imagination of things which we observe in the same way with relation to an earlier or present time and consequently we imagine things relating to a present time or an earlier or future time as contingent.

COROLLARIUM II: De natura rationis est res sub quadam æternitatis specie percipere.

Concerning the nature of reason it is that it perceives things under a certain species of eternity.

DEMONSTRATIO: De natura enim rationis est res ut necessarias et non ut contingentes contemplari (per propositionem præcedentem). Hanc autem rerum necessitatem (per propositionem 41 hujus) vere hoc est (per axioma 6 partis I) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (per propositionem 16 partis I) hæc rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei æternæ naturæ necessitas; ergo de natura rationis est res sub hac æternitatis specie contemplari. Adde quod fundamenta rationis notiones sint (per propositionem 38 hujus) quæ illa explicant quæ omnibus communia sunt quæque (per propositionem 37 hujus) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant quæque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione sed sub quadam æternitatis specie debent concipi. Q.E.D. 

Concerning the nature of reason it is that it observes things as necessary and not as contingent (by IIP43). Moreover it perceives this necessity of things (by IIP41) truly, that is (by IA6) as in itself. But (IP16) this necessity of things is the necessity itself of God's eternal nature; thus concerning the nature of reason is that is observes things under the this species of eternity. Ad what are the fundament notions of reason (by IIP38) which explicate those things which are common to all and which (by IIP37) do not explicate the essence of any singular thing and besides which ought be conceived without any relation of time but under a certain species of eternity.

Spinoza's Ethics: IIP.43

This proposition, demonstration and scholium are difficult. The proposition asserts that we know a true idea and that we know that we know a true idea. The first aspect - of knowing a true idea - is an assertion of content. The second aspect - of knowing that we know a true idea - is an assertion of our nature of knowing, or alternatively, an assertion of form.

The demonstration initially focuses on the first aspect - of knowing a true idea. This true idea is identified as adequate as well as explicated by the nature of the human mind. Spinoza references the corollary of IIP11 in which he identifies the muddled origins of inadequate ideas so that he can identify here the focused origin of the adequate idea which is only of the human mind or as he states it - "explicated by the nature of the human mind" - which of course is the idea of the body. The idea of this idea, or alternatively, the idea of the human mind sets up the parallelism of IIP20 where the idea of the human mind is the same in God as the idea of human body. The demonstration and the scholium posit that there exists a dual parallelism where the body and the idea of the body as mind are parallel as well as the idea of the body and the idea of the idea of the body are parallel. As Spinoza works this out, he is indicating that this dual parallelism does refer to a different form of knowing. At the first level - the body and the idea of the body - there is modally one of expression or content or change. When this mode is adequate under the attribute of thinking, the mode is active in knowing within the passage of time. At the second level - the idea of the body and the idea of the idea of the body or the idea of the human mind, there is a modal structure but it is one of consciousness or reflexivity on modal essences. Thus, it is one of form as in the example earlier in the Ethics of modal essences of infinite squares inside a circle. Knowing here at the second level might be considered meditative or contemplative as it is a knowing that is not subject to time and more deeply certain. In this area, Spinoza indicates that it is not as much learning (which is of the first level) but discovering what was already known - as some kind of logic that forms the makeup of the human mind itself - unlike the human mind's role as of the body (with pain and other sensations).

Qui veram habet ideam, simul scit se veram habere ideam nec de rei veritate potest dubitare.

The person who has a true idea - at the same time knows that she (or he) has a true idea and is not able to doubt the truthfulness of the thing.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea vera in nobis est illa quæ in Deo quatenus per naturam mentis humanæ explicatur, est adæquata (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus). Ponamus itaque dari in Deo quatenus per naturam mentis humanæ explicatur, ideam adæquatam A. Hujus ideæ debet necessario dari etiam in Deo idea quæ ad Deum eodem modo refertur ac idea A (per propositionem 20 hujus cujus demonstratio universalis est). At idea A ad Deum referri supponitur quatenus per naturam mentis humanæ explicatur; ergo etiam idea ideæ A ad Deum eodem modo debet referri hoc est (per idem corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) hæc adæquata idea ideæ A erit in ipsa mente quæ ideam adæquatam A habet adeoque qui adæquatam habet ideam sive (per propositionem 34 hujus) qui vere rem cognoscit, debet simul suæ cognitionis adæquatam habere ideam sive veram cognitionem hoc est (ut per se manifestum) debet simul esse certus. Q.E.D.

A true idea in us is that which is adequate in God insofar as it [God] is explicated by the nature of the human mind (by IIP11C). Therefore we might argue that an adequate idea A exists in God insofar as it [God] is explicated by the nature of the human mind. The idea of this idea must necessarily also exist that refers to God in the same way as idea A (by IIP20 the demonstration of which is universal). But idea A is supposed to refer to God insofar as it [God] is explicated by the nature of the human mind; therefore also the idea of idea A must be referred to God in the same way, that is (by the same IIP11C) this adequate idea of idea A will be in the mind itself which has adequate idea A to the degree which the person who has an adequate idea or (by IIP34) who knows the thing truly, must at the same time have an adequate idea of its knowledge or a true knowledge, that is (as is clear through itself) must at the same time be certain.

SCHOLIUM: In scholio propositionis 21 hujus partis explicui quid sit idea ideæ sed notandum præcedentem propositionem per se satis esse manifestam. Nam nemo qui veram habet ideam, ignorat veram ideam summam certitudinem involvere; veram namque habere ideam nihil aliud significat quam perfecte sive optime rem cognoscere nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest nisi putet ideam quid mutum instar picturæ in tabula et non modum cogitandi esse nempe ipsum intelligere et quæso quis scire potest se rem aliquam intelligere nisi prius rem intelligat? hoc est quis potest scire se de aliqua re certum esse nisi prius de ea re certus sit? Deinde quid idea vera clarius et certius dari potest quod norma sit veritatis? Sane sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est. Atque his me ad has quæstiones respondisse puto nempe si idea vera quatenus tantum dicitur cum suo ideato convenire, a falsa distinguitur, nihil ergo realitatis aut perfectionis idea vera habet præ falsa (quandoquidem per solam denominationem extrinsecam distinguuntur) et consequenter neque etiam homo qui veras præ illo qui falsas tantum ideas habet? Deinde unde fit ut homines falsas habeant ideas? Et denique unde aliquis certo scire potest se ideas habere quæ cum suis ideatis conveniant? Ad has inquam quæstiones me jam respondisse puto. Nam quod ad differentiam inter ideam veram et falsam attinet, constat ex propositione 35 hujus illam ad hanc sese habere ut ens ad non-ens. Falsitatis autem causas a propositione 19 usque ad 35 cum ejus scholio clarissime ostendi. Ex quibus etiam apparet quid homo qui veras habet ideas, homini qui non nisi falsas habet, intersit. Quod denique ultimum attinet nempe undenam homo scire potest se habere ideam quæ cum suo ideato conveniat, id modo satis superque ostendi ex hoc solo oriri quod ideam habet quæ cum suo ideato convenit sive quod veritas sui sit norma. His adde quod mens nostra quatenus res vere percipit, pars est infiniti Dei intellectus (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) adeoque tam necesse est ut mentis claræ et distinctæ ideæ veræ sint ac Dei ideæ. 

In IIP21S, I have explained what might be the idea of the idea by noting the preceding proposition is clear enough through itself. For no one who has a true idea, is ignorant that the true idea involves the greatest certainty; for to have a true idea signifies nothing other than to know a thing perfectly or optimally and someone sane is not able to doubt this matter unless the person thinks the idea is mute as a picture on a tablet and not as a way for thinking to be, of course, to understand itself and I ask who is able to know that he understands something unless he first understands it? Next what idea is able to exist more clear and more than what is the measure is truth? Truly just as light reveals itself and shadows, thus truth is the measure of itself and falsehood. And so I believe that with these I have responded to these questions if a true idea insofar as it is said to match enough with its ideation, is distinguished from a false idea, thus nothing of reality or perfection has a true idea beyond a false one (since they are distinguished by the extrinsic denomination alone) and consequently also not even a man who has true ideas beyond that person which has false ideas. Next from where come false ideas which humans have? And next from where someone is able to know certainly that he has ideas which match with their ideations? To these questions I believe that I have already responded. For what holds fast to the difference between a true idea and a false idea, it stands from IIP35 to have this for itself as being and non-being. Moreover I have shown the causes of falsehood from IIP19 to P35 with its scholium most clearly. From these, it is also apparent what separates a person who has true ideas from the person with nothing but false ideas. Finally what holds fast at last of course from where a man is able to know that he has an idea which agrees with its ideation, in what way I have shown enough above, from this alone arises that has an idea which agrees with its ideation or what truth might be a measure to itself. To these add what our mind insofar as it perceives a thing truly, the part is the intellect of infinite God (by IIP11C) to a degree it is so necessary that clear and distinct ideas of the mind are true as ideas of God.

Spinoza's Ethics: IIP.42

This proposition build on the objective truth of the prior proposition to the power of the act of understanding as it operates. The demonstration hints at a proofing issue similarly embedded in today's cliche IYKYK. To those for whom the distinction is not evident through itself, this issue is difficult to prove as there is likely to be a self-referencing issue. This is a criticism that is also repeatedly asserted at Spinoza and his framework.

Secundi et tertii et non primi generis cognitio docet nos verum a falso distinguere.

Knowledge of the second and third and not the first leads us to distinguish true from false.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio per se patet. Qui enim inter verum et falsum scit distinguere, debet adæquatam veri et falsi habere ideam hoc est (per II scholium propositionis 40 hujus) verum et falsum secundo aut tertio cognitionis genere cognoscere.

This proposition is evident through itself. For the person who knows how to distinguish between true and false, ought to have an adequate idea of the true and the false, that is (by IIP40S) to know the true and false by means of the second and third kind of knowledge.