Spinoza's Ethics: III.P1

Mens nostra quædam agit, quædam vero patitur nempe quatenus adæquatas habet ideas eatenus quædam necessario agit et quatenus ideas habet inadæquatas eatenus necessario quædam patitur.

Our mind does some things, truly it endures some things; indeed insofar as it has adequate ideas to such an extent does it do some things necessarily and insofar as it has inadequate ideas to such an extent does it endure some things necessarily.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cujuscunque humanæ mentis ideæ aliæ adæquatæ sunt, aliæ autem mutilatæ et confusæ (per scholia propositionis 40 partis II). Ideæ autem quæ in alicujus mente sunt adæquatæ, sunt in Deo adæquatæ quatenus ejusdem mentis essentiam constituit (per corollarium propositionis 11 partis II) et quæ deinde inadæquatæ sunt in mente, sunt etiam in Deo (per idem corollarium) adæquatæ non quatenus ejusdem solummodo mentis essentiam sed etiam quatenus aliarum rerum mentes in se simul continet. Deinde ex data quacunque idea aliquis effectus sequi necessario debet (per propositionem 36 partis I) cujus effectus Deus causa est adæquata (vide definitionem 1 hujus) non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus data illa idea affectus consideratur (vide propositionem 9 partis II). At ejus effectus cujus Deus est causa quatenus affectus est idea quæ in alicujus mente est adæquata, illa eadem mens est causa adæquata (per corollarium propositionis 11 partis II). Ergo mens nostra (per definitionem 2 hujus) quatenus ideas habet adæquatas, quædam necessario agit, quod erat primum. Deinde quicquid necessario sequitur ex idea quæ in Deo est adæquata, non quatenus mentem unius hominis tantum sed quatenus aliarum rerum mentes simul cum ejusdem hominis mente in se habet, ejus (per idem corollarium propositionis 11 partis II) illius hominis mens non est causa adæquata sed partialis ac proinde (per definitionem 2 hujus) mens quatenus ideas inadæquatas habet, quædam necessario patitur. Quod erat secundum. Ergo mens nostra etc. Q.E.D.

Some ideas of whatsoever human mind are adequate, however others are mutilated and confused (by IIP40S). Moreover, ideas which are adequate in the mind of someone, are adequate in God insofar as God constitutes the essence of the person's mind (by IIP11C) and those which indeed are inadequate in the mind, are also adequate in God (by the same corollary) not insofar as the essence of the person's mind alone but also insofar as God contains the minds of other things in itself at the same time. Next from whatsoever given idea some effect ought to follow necessarily (by IP36) of whose effect God is the adequate cause (see IIID1) not insofar as God is infinite but insofar as the affect given by that idea is considered (see IIP9). But the person's effect of which God is the cause insofar as the affect is the idea which is adequate in the mind of someone else, that same mind is the adequate cause (by IIP11C). Thus our mind (by IIID2) insofar as it has adequate ideas, does some things necessarily, which was first. Next some thing follows necessarily from an idea which is adequate in God, not insofar as it has the mind of one person but only insofar as it has the minds of other things at the same time it has with the mind of this person in itself, whose (by IIP11C) mind of that man is not the adequate but partial cause and then (by IIID2) the mind insofar as it has inadequate ideas, endures some things necessarily. Which ought to follow. Thus our mind, etc.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem eo pluribus passionibus esse obnoxiam quo plures ideas inadæquatas habet et contra eo plura agere quo plures habet adæquatas.

From this it follows that the mind is troubled in that direction by more passions to the extent that it has more inadequate ideas and against that direction it does more things to the extent that it has adequate ideas.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.Post.2

Spinoza outlines the fundamental basis for memory and thus thought and imagination by positing that the body is changed in some physical way that gives rise to a cognitive experience which reflects the change which occurred physically.

Corpus humanum multas pati potest mutationes et nihilominus retinere objectorum impressiones seu vestigia (de quibus vide postulatum 5 partis II) et consequenter easdem rerum imagines; quarum definitionem vide in scholio propositionis 17 partis II. 

The body of a human is able to endure changes and nothing less to retain the impressions of objects or vestiges (about which see II Post.5) and consequently the same images of things; whose definition see in IIP17S.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.Post1

Spinoza begins his approach to the human body as a form of physics - just as he indicated in the preface. The implicit physics here is the unity of the human body as a complex composite. This sets up that affecting some parts increases a power of acting while affecting other parts decreases a power of acting. Crucial to both affections is that the body retains its unity.

Corpus humanum potest multis affici modis quibus ipsius agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur et etiam aliis qui ejusdem agendi potentiam nec majorem nec minorem reddunt. Hoc postulatum seu axioma nititur postulato 1 et lemmatibus 5 et 7, quæ vide post propositionem 13 partis II.

The human body is able to be affected by many things in many ways by which the power of acting itself is increased or decreased and even by others which return the power of acting itself neither more nor less. This postulate or axiom is supported by Postulate 1 and Lemmas 5 and 7, which see after IIP13.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.D3: Affect

Per affectum intelligo corporis affectiones quibus ipsius corporis agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur et simul harum affectionum ideas. Si itaque alicujus harum affectionum adæquata possimus esse causa, tum per affectum actionem intelligo, alias passionem.

By affect I understand modifications of the body by which the power of the body acting is increased or diminished, or helped or compelled and the ideas of these modifications at the same time. If in such a way we are able to be the adequate cause of some of these modifications, then by affect I understand action, otherwise passion.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.D2: Active Vs. Passive

Nos tum agere dico cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit cujus adæquata sumus causa hoc est (per definitionem præcedentem) cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis aut extra nos sequitur quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico cum in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur cujus nos non nisi partialis sumus causa.

Next I say that we are active when something in us or outside us happens of which we are the adequate cause, that is (by III.D1) when from our nature something in us or outside us follows which, through the same (nature) alone, is able to be understood clearly and distinctly. But in contrast I say that we are passive when in us something happens or from outside our nature something follows of which we are not the cause unless partially.  

Here Spinoza builds on the concept of adequate cause in the prior definition. The idea of being a sole cause is a high bar for adequacy. For example, it would seem that I am the cause of my breathing, but according to the rigor of Spinoza's definition, that does not seem true. I require oxygen for breathing and this is not something I generate myself. However, the part of the process of breathing which occurs after I have gotten oxygen may be an area in which I am the adequate cause. If this is true, then breathing is a complex process in which part of it is active (after getting oxygen) and the other part is passive (getting the oxygen).

Spinoza's Ethics: III.D1: Adequate Cause

Causam adæquatam appello eam cujus effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi. Inadæquatam autem seu partialem illam voco cujus effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit.

I name an adequate cause that whose effect is able to be perceived clearly and distinctly. Moreover I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect is not able to be understood through itself alone.

Spinoza starts his three book discussion on human affects with causal clarity. He is interested in calling something an adequate cause based on the effect that it generates. This first step is important as his approach is based on many of the human affects being grounded in biases. Adequacy is an attempt to remove biases.

 

Spinoza's Ethics: III. Preface

Plerique qui de affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus quæ communes naturæ leges sequuntur sed de rebus quæ extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturæ ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanæ deinde impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causam non communi naturæ potentiæ sed nescio cui naturæ humanæ vitio tribuunt quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur et qui humanæ mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur. Non defuerunt tamen viri præstantissimi (quorum labori et industriæ nos multum debere fatemur) qui de recta vivendi ratione præclara multa scripserint et plena prudentiæ consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo quod sciam determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam crediderit mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare simulque viam ostendere studuisse qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium sed mea quidem sententia nihil præter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt quam intelligere. His sine dubio mirum videbitur quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea quæ rationi repugnare quæque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea hæc est ratio. Nihil in natura fit quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia hoc est naturæ leges et regulæ secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eædem atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcunque naturam intelligendi nempe per leges et regulas naturæ universales. Affectus itaque odii, iræ, invidiæ etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturæ necessitate et virtute consequuntur ac reliqua singularia ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt per quas intelliguntur certasque proprietates habent cognitione nostra æque dignas ac proprietates cujuscunque alterius rei cujus sola contemplatione delectamur. De affectuum itaque natura et viribus ac mentis in eosdem potentia eadem methodo agam qua in præcedentibus de Deo et mente egi et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde ac si quæstio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.

Most who write about the affects and the reason of living of humans do not seem to discuss concerning the natural things which follow the common laws of nature but concerning those which are beyond nature. Indeed they seem to conceive of man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that humanity disrupts the order of nature more than follows (the order of nature) and to have absolute power itself in humanity's actions and not by another is humanity more determined than by itself. Finally the cause of human impotence and inconstancy is not the power of common nature but I do not know to what fault of human nature they attribute than they cry, laugh, condemn whatever most happens, they detest and who know to complain of power of the human mind more eloquently and more forcefully as if it has divinity. Nevertheless the most eminent of people have handed down (for whose labor and industry we confess we owe much) who have written many excellent things concerning the right way of living and have given many plans of wisdom to mortals; yet truly no one has outlined what I know on the nature and power of the affects and what against them the mind is able to do against moderating these. Indeed I know the most celebrated Descartes, of course even he might have believed that the mind has absolute power on its own actions, nevertheless to explain human feelings through its own first causes and at the same time to have studied to show the way in which the mind is able to have absolute power over the affect but my own sentiment is that he showed nothing other than his own ingenuity as I will demonstrate in its place. For I wish to return to those who prefer to hate or ridicule the actions and affects of humans rather than understand them. To these without a doubt it will seem amazing because I will move forward to explain the sins and errors of humans in a geometric method and I wish to show in a clear method things which repulse reason which they claim to be vain, absurd and horrible. But this is my rationale. Nothing happens in nature which one might attribute to some error of nature itself. For nature is always the same and where it is the same and one in its power and potential for action, that is, the laws of nature and the rules following which everything makes happen and changes from one form into others, are everywhere and always the same and to such a degree one and always the same and also ought to be the reason of things and for understanding nature of qualities, indeed through the laws and universal rules of nature. The affects, in this way, of hatred, envy etc. considered in themselves follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other singularities and next they are ignorant of certain causes by which they understand and certain properties have by our thought equally worthy and properties of whatsoever other thing whose by only our contemplation we are delighted. Thus, concerning the nature and strengths of feelings and the power of the mind over them I will lead in the same way which I led concerning God and the mind and I will consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies.