Spinoza's Ethics: III.P40 - Reciprocity of Hatred

Qui se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur nec se ullam odii causam illi dedisse credit, eundem odio contra habebit.

Whoever imagines that one has hatred from another and does not believe that one has any cause of hatred to that person, will have hatred to that same in return.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui aliquem odio affectum imaginatur, eo ipso etiam odio afficietur (per propositionem 27 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ. At ipse (per hypothesin) nullam hujus tristitiæ causam imaginatur præter illum qui ipsum odio habet; ergo ex hoc quod se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, tristitia afficietur concomitante idea ejus qui ipsum odio habet sive (per idem scholium) eundem odio habebit. Q.E.D.

Whoever imagines someone affected by hatred, there also will be affected by hatred by the same person (by IIIP27 [Empathy]), that is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But oneself (by hypothesis) imagines that the cause of this sadness is nothing except that one who has hatred; thus from this because one imagines that one is hated by another, is affected by sadness accompanied by the idea of the one who has hatred or (by the same scholium) will have hated toward the same one.

SCHOLIUM: Quod si se justam odii causam præbuisse imaginatur, tum (per propositionem 30 hujus et ejusdem scholium) pudore afficietur. Sed hoc (per propositionem 25 hujus) raro contingit. Præterea hæc odii reciprocatio oriri etiam potest ex eo quod odium sequatur conatus malum inferendi ei qui odio habetur (per propositionem 39 hujus). Qui igitur se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, eundem alicujus mali sive tristitiæ causam imaginabitur atque adeo tristitia afficietur seu metu concomitante idea ejus qui ipsum odio habet tanquam causa hoc est odio contra afficietur ut supra.

Which if one imagines oneself the just cause of hatred, then (by IIIP30 and IIIP30S [Looking at Others Looking at Us]) one is afflicted by shame. But this (by IIIP25 [Love Bias]) happens rarely. Besides the reciprocity of hatred is also able to arise from where which hatred follows persisting by implying evil to one who has hatred (by IIIP39 [Self-interest Perception]). Thus whoever imagines that one has hatred from another, will imagine that person to be the cause of some evil or sadness and to such an extent is afflicted by sadness or fear accompanied by the idea of one who has hatred towards oneself as if that one is the cause that is, is afflicted by hatred in return as [noted] above.

COROLLARIUM I: Qui quem amat odio erga se affectum imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Nam quatenus imaginatur ab eodem se odio haberi, determinatur (per propositionem præcedentem) ad eundem contra odio habendum. At (per hypothesin) ipsum nihilominus amat : ergo odio et amore simul conflictabitur.

Whoever imagines someone whom one loves to be affected with hatred towards oneself, will be conflicted with hatred and love at the same time. For insofar as one imagines that one has hatred to oneself from another, it is determined (by IIIP39 [Self-interest Perception]) that one must have hatred for that person in return. But (by hypothesis) there is nothing less than one loves the person: thus, one will be conflicted with love and hatred at the same time.

COROLLARIUM II: Si aliquis imaginatur ab aliquo quem antea nullo affectu prosecutus est, malum aliquod præ odio sibi illatum esse, statim idem malum eidem referre conabitur.

If someone imagines that something bad is introduced towards oneself, especially hatred, from someone whom up to that point one followed with no affect, then immediately one will try to bear an evil towards that one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui aliquem odio erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eum contra (per præcedentem propositionem) odio habebit et (per propositionem 26 hujus) id omne comminisci conabitur quod eundem possit tristitia afficere atque id eidem (per propositionem 39 hujus) inferre studebit. At (per hypothesin) primum quod hujusmodi imaginatur, est malum sibi illatum; ergo idem statim eidem inferre conabitur. Q.E.D.

Whoever imagines that some is affected by hatred towards oneself, will have hatred against that person (by preceding proposition) and (by IIIP26) will try everything to think up what is able to affect that person with sadness and will be eager to bear that to the same person (by IIIP39). But, (by hypothesis) one first imagines of another's way what has been ill borne towards oneself; thus immediately one will try to bear likewise to that person.

SCHOLIUM: Conatus malum inferendi ei quem odimus ira vocatur; conatus autem malum nobis illatum referendi vindicta appellatur.

Persisting to bear an evil to whom we hate is called anger; moreover persisting for carrying that evil to us is named vindictiveness.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P39 - Self-Interest Perception

Qui aliquem odio habet, ei malum inferre conabitur nisi ex eo majus sibi malum oriri timeat et contra qui aliquem amat, ei eadem lege benefacere conabitur.

Whoever has hatred towards someone, will try to inflict a bad thing on that one unless from that [action] one fears a greater bad to oneself would arise and in contrast whoever has love towards someone, will try to do good for that one by the same rule.

DEMONSTRATIO: Aliquem odio habere est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) aliquem ut tristitiæ causam imaginari adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus) is qui aliquem odio habet, eundem amovere vel destruere conabitur. Sed si inde aliquid tristius sive (quod idem est) majus malum sibi timeat idque se vitare posse credit non inferendo ei quem odit malum quod meditabatur, a malo inferendo (per eandem propositionem 28 hujus) abstinere cupiet idque (per propositionem 37 hujus) majore conatu quam quo tenebatur inferendi malum, qui propterea prævalebit, ut volebamus. Secundæ partis demonstratio eodem modo procedit. Ergo qui aliquem odio habet etc. Q.E.D.

To have hatred towards someone is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) someone whom one imagines as the cause of sadness to such an extent (by IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) that the one who has hatred for such a person will try to remove or destroy that person. But if from where some greater sadness or (what is the same) greater evil one might fear to oneself and that one believes that one is able to avoid that harm which one plans by not carrying out against the one whom he hates, from carrying out harm (by the same IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) one might desire to abstain and that (by IIIP37 [Feedback Loop for Desire]) with greater persisting that by which one has held on to carrying out harm, who meanwhile will overcome, as we imparted. The demonstration of the following part proceeds in the same way. Therefore, whoever has hatred of someone etc.

SCHOLIUM: Per bonum hic intelligo omne genus lætitiæ et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit et præcipue id quod desiderio qualecunque illud sit, satisfacit. Per malum autem omne tristitiæ genus et præcipue id quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (in scholio propositionis 9 hujus) ostendimus nos nihil cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra id bonum vocamus quod cupimus et consequenter id quod aversamur malum appellamus; quare unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat seu æstimat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid pejus et quid denique optimum quidve pessimum sit. Sic avarus argenti copiam optimum, ejus autem inopiam pessimum judicat. Ambitiosus autem nihil æque ac gloriam cupit et contra nihil æque ac pudorem reformidat. Invido deinde nihil jucundius quam alterius infelicitas et nihil molestius quam aliena felicitas ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse judicat. Cæterum hic affectus quo homo ita disponitur ut id quod vult nolit vel ut id quod non vult velit, timor vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum quod futurum judicat, minore vitandum (vide propositionem 28 hujus). Sed si malum quod timet pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia. Denique si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali ita ut quid potius velit, nesciat, tum metus vocatur consternatio præcipue si utrumque malum quod timetur ex maximis sit. 

By good here I mean any kind of joy that fulfills and whatever leads to the same and especially that which fulfills whatever desire whatsoever there may be. By bad, moreover, every kind of sadness and especially that which frustrates desire. For above (in IIIP9S [Awareness of Persisting]) we have shown that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good but instead we call it good because we desire it and consequently that which we avoid we call bad; wherefore each and everyone judges or if estimates from ones own emotion what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse and finally what the best and the worst might be. Thus one who is greedy for the fullest supply of silver, moreover judges the worst scarcity of oneself. Moreover nothing is like the ambitious one who desires glory and, in contrast, nothing is like one who dreads shame. Next envy is nothing more pleasing than the unhappiness of another and nothing more annoying than the happiness of another and thus each and every person judges from ones own emotion whether some thing is good or bad, useful or useless. Here the other emotion by which a person is so inclined that which one does not prefer what one wants or prefers that which one does not want, is called fear, which next is nothing other than fear insofar as a person is disinclined from something which one judges to be bad in the future, avoiding less (see IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]). But if it is a bad which one fears might be shame, then that fear is called bashfulness. Next if desire for avoiding a future evil is forced by fear of another evil so that one might wish that instead, one does not know, then the fear is called consternation especially if either of the evils which one fears are from greatest things.

In this proposition, Spinoza outlines the constraining effect of self-interest on regulation of emotion-motivated action. This allows a pathway towards "enlightened selfishness." The concept of how an action may or may not be in our best interest - the so-called "think the drink" concept - has power. Of course, this power is limited relative to the actual desire which, as he addresses in the scholium, can ever go so far as to drive our value frameworks that we assume are universal or at least communally shared. In fact, Spinoza even goes so far as to describe how these value frameworks are singular and rooted in our individual "drugs of choice."

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P38 - Bigger the Love, Bigger the Hate

Si quis rem amatam odio habere inceperit ita ut amor plane aboleatur, eandem majore odio ex pari causa prosequetur quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset et eo majore quo amor antea major fuerat.

If anyone begins to have hatred towards a beloved one so that the love is clearly destroyed, one follows the same one with a greater hatred from an equal cause than if one might never have loved this one itself and so much greater as much greater as the love had been before.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam si quis rem quam amat, odio habere incipit, plures ejus appetitus coercentur quam si eandem non amavisset. Amor namque lætitia est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) quam homo quantum potest (per propositionem 28 hujus) conservare conatur idque (per idem scholium) rem amatam ut præsentem contemplando eandemque (per propositionem 21 hujus) lætitia quantum potest afficiendo, qui quidem conatus (per propositionem præcedentem) eo est major quo amor major est ut et conatus efficiendi ut res amata ipsum contra amet (vide propositionem 33 hujus). At hi conatus odio erga rem amatam coercentur (per corollarium propositionis 13 et per propositionem 23 hujus); ergo amans (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) hac etiam de causa tristitia afficietur et eo majore quo amor major fuerat hoc est præter tristitiam quæ odii fuit causa, alia ex eo oritur quod rem amavit et consequenter majore tristitiæ affectu rem amatam contemplabitur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) majore odio prosequetur quam si eandem non amavisset et eo majore quo amor major fuerat. Q.E.D.

For if anyone loves one which one is beginning to have hatred, more things restrain ones appetite than if one had not loved it. For love is joy (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget) which one tries as much as one is able to save (by IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) and this (by the same scholium) is contemplating the beloved one as present and the same (by IIIP21 [Responsiveness to Beloved]) joy as much as it can affect which indeed persisting (by the preceding proposition) is the more it is the greater is the love so that and the persisting for acting so that the beloved loves oneself in return (see IIIP33 [Reciprocity of Likeness]). But by this persisting, hatred against the beloved one restrains (by IIIP13C [Conatus to Forget] and IIIP23 [Hatred Gives Opposite]); therefore loving (by IIIP11 [Good for Body, Good for Mind]) also is affected by this cause by sadness and the more so the greater the love had been, that is besides sadness which has been the cause of hatred, other from where it arises because one has loved a thing and consequently by the greater the emotion of sadness one will contemplate the beloved that is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) with greater hatred it follows than if one had not loved the same and so the greater it is the greater the love had been.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P37 - Feedback Loop for Desire

Cupiditas quæ præ tristitia vel lætitia præque odio vel amore oritur, eo est major quo affectus major est.

Desire which arises on behalf of sadness or joy and on behalf of hatred or love, is the greater as the greater the emotion.

DEMONSTRATIO: Tristitia hominis agendi potentiam (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) minuit vel coercet hoc est (per propositionem 7 hujus) conatum quo homo in suo esse perseverare conatur, minuit vel coercet adeoque (per propositionem 5 hujus) huic conatui est contraria et quicquid homo tristitia affectus conatur, est tristitiam amovere. At (per tristitiæ definitionem) quo tristitia major est, eo majori parti hominis agendi potentiæ necesse est opponi; ergo quo major tristitia est, eo majore agendi potentia conabitur homo contra tristitiam amovere hoc est (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) eo majore cupiditate sive appetitu conabitur tristitiam amovere. Deinde quoniam lætitia (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus) hominis agendi potentiam auget vel juvat, facile eadem via demonstratur quod homo lætitia affectus nihil aliud cupit quam eandem conservare idque eo majore cupiditate quo lætitia major erit. Denique quoniam odium et amor sunt ipsi tristitiæ vel lætitiæ affectus, sequitur eodem modo quod conatus, appetitus sive cupiditas quæ præ odio vel amore oritur, major erit pro ratione odii et amoris. Q.E.D.

Sadness diminishes the power of acting of a human (by IIIP11S [Good for Body, Good for Mind]) or restrains, that is (by IIIP7 [Efforting]) the efforting by which a human tries to persevere to be in oneself, diminishes or restrains to such a degree (by IIIP5 [Self-Contradiction]) is contrary to this efforting and whatever person with an emotion by sadness attempts is to remove the sadness. But (by the definition of sadness) the greater is the sadness, then the greater part is the necessity of the power of acting to oppose; thus the greater the sadness, the greater by the power of acting will a person try to remove against the sadness that is (by IIIP9S [Awareness of Efforting]) by the greater desire and appetite will one try to remove the sadness. Next since joy (by the same IIIP11S [Good for Body, Good for Mind]) increases or aides the power of a human's acting, it is demonstrated easily in the same way because a person with the emotion of (by) joy desires nothing else than to keep the same and the greater the desire, the greater will be the joy. Finally because love and hate are emotions of sadness and joy themselves, it follows in the same way because efforting, whether as appetite or desire which arises from hatred or love, will be more on behalf of the reason of hatred or love.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P36 - Pleasure Context

Qui rei qua semel delectatus est, recordatur, cupit eadem cum iisdem potiri circumstantiis ac cum primo ipsa delectatus est.

Whoever has been pleased by a thing at one time, it is remembered, one desires that the same thing is gained with the same circumstances as when one was first pleased.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid homo simul cum re quæ ipsum delectavit, vidit, id omne (per propositionem 15 hujus) erit per accidens lætitiæ causa adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus) omni eo simul cum re quæ ipsum delectavit, potiri cupiet sive re cum omnibus iisdem circumstantiis potiri cupiet ac cum primo eadem delectatus est. Q.E.D.

Whatever person at the same time with a thing which one has taken pleasure in itself, one sees, it all (by IIIP15 [Association]) will be by accident the cause of joy to such a degree (by IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) at the same time where with a thing which one has taken pleasure in itself, will desire to possess every thing or will desire to possess the thing with all the same circumstances, and with the same thing as it was first delighted in.

COROLLARIUM: Si itaque unam ex iis circumstantiis deficere compererit, amans contristabitur.

Thus, if someone might discover one thing missing from these circumstance, the loving person will be saddened.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam quatenus aliquam circumstantiam deficere comperit eatenus aliquid imaginatur quod ejus rei existentiam secludit. Cum autem ejus rei sive circumstantiæ (per propositionem præcedentem) sit præ amore cupidus, ergo (per propositionem 19 hujus) quatenus eandem deficere imaginatur, contristabitur. Q.E.D.

For as much as one discovers that some circumstance is missing just as much as might one imagine that something because of which hides the existence of the thing. Moreover when of its thing or circumstance (by IIIP35 [Jealousy]) is a desire for love, thus (by IIIP19 [Impact on Loved One]) insofar as it imagines the same to be missing, one is saddened.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc tristitia quatenus absentiam ejus quod amamus, respicit, desiderium vocatur.

This sadness insofar as it reflects the absence of that which we love, it called longing.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P35 - Jealousy

Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel arctiore vinculo amicitiæ quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, odio erga ipsam rem amatam afficietur et illi alteri invidebit.

If anyone imagines the beloved one with the same or tighter bond of friendship by which one alone possessed the same (beloved one), that joins another to oneself, by hatred is one affected toward the beloved one and will envy that other one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quo quis majore amore rem amatam erga se affectam esse imaginatur, eo magis gloriabitur (per præcedentem propositionem ) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus ) lætabitur adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus ) conabitur quantum potest imaginari rem amatam ipsi quam arctissime devinctam, qui quidem conatus sive appetitus fomentatur si alium idem sibi cupere imaginatur (per propositionem 31 hujus). At hic conatus sive appetitus ab ipsius rei amatæ imagine, concomitante imagine illius quem res amata sibi jungit, coerceri supponitur; ergo (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) eo ipso tristitia afficietur concomitante idea rei amatæ tanquam causa et simul imagine alterius hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) odio erga rem amatam afficietur et simul erga illum alterum (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) cui propterea (per propositionem 23 hujus) quod re amata delectatur, invidebit. Q.E.D.

The more anyone imagines that the beloved one has been affected with a greater love towards oneself, so the more will one be proud (by IIIP34 [The More We Do the More We Try]), that is (by IIIP30S [Looking at Others Looking at Us]) will be overjoyed to the degree (by IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) one will try as much as one is able to imagine the beloved one bound to oneself as closely as possible, who indeed effort or desire foments if one imagines that anyone else desires the same thing for that self (by IIIP31 [Confirmation Bias]). But here effort or desire from the image of the beloved one itself, accompanied by the image of another to whom the beloved joins oneself, is thought to be forced; thus (by IIIP11S [Good for Body, Good for Mind]), by this itself sadness is affected accompanied by the idea of the beloved one as if the cause and at the same time by the image of the other, that is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) with hatred is one affected toward the beloved one and at the same time towards that other (by IIIP15C [Association]) to whom besides (by IIIP23 [Hatred Gives Opposite]) because one is delighted by the beloved one, one will envy.

SCHOLIUM: Hoc odium erga rem amatam invidiæ junctum zelotypia vocatur, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam animi fluctuatio orta ex amore et odio simul concomitante idea alterius cui invidetur. Præterea hoc odium erga rem amatam majus erit pro ratione lætitiæ qua zelotypus ex reciproco rei amatæ amore solebat affici et etiam pro ratione affectus quo erga illum quem sibi rem amatam jungere imaginatur, affectus erat. Nam si eum oderat, eo ipso rem amatam (per propositionem 24 hujus) odio habebit quia ipsam id quod ipse odio habet, lætitia afficere imaginatur et etiam (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) ex eo quod rei amatæ imaginem imagini ejus quem odit, jungere cogitur, quæ ratio plerumque locum habet in amore erga fæminam; qui enim imaginatur mulierem quam amat alteri sese prostituere, non solum ex eo quod ipsius appetitus coercetur, contristabitur sed etiam quia rei amatæ imaginem pudendis et excrementis alterius jungere cogitur, eandem aversatur; ad quod denique accedit quod zelotypus non eodem vultu quem res amata ei præbere solebat, ab eadem excipiatur, qua etiam de causa amans contristatur, ut jam ostendam.

This hatred toward a beloved one is called envy joined with jealousy, which next is nothing other than a fluctuation of spirit arising from love and at the same time hatred accompanied by the idea of another  whom one envies. Besides this hatred towards a beloved one is more on account of the joy which jealousy was accustomed to affect from a reciprocal love of the beloved one and also on account of the emotion by which toward that whom one imagines that the beloved one joins to oneself, has been affected. For if one has hated that person, from this itself will one have hatred for the beloved (by IIIP24 [Hatred gives Opposite to Others]) since oneself has hatred to that, one imagines to affect with joy and also (by IIIP15C [Association]) because one hates to imagine the image of the beloved whom he hates, is compelled to join, which reason and more has place in love towards the woman; who for he imagines the wife whom he loves to have prostituted herself, not only because ones appetite is coerced, one suffers but also since one is compelled to join the image of the privates of the beloved one and disgusting parts of the other, one avoids the same; to which next he falls since jealousy not with the same face which the beloved is accustomed to put forward to him, from the same he is excluded, by which cause also loving is misery as I have shown already.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P34 - The More We Do The More We Try

Quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis gloriabimur.

The greater the emotion by which we imagine that the beloved one has been affected with respect to ourselves, the more we will boast.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nos (per propositionem præcedentem) conamur quantum possumus ut res amata nos contra amet hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut res amata lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri. Quo itaque rem amatam majore lætitia nostra de causa affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis hic conatus juvatur hoc est (per propositionem 11 hujus cum ejus scholio) eo majore lætitia afficimur. At cum ex eo lætemur quod alium nobis similem lætitia affecimus, tum nosmet cum lætitia contemplamur (per propositionem 30 hujus) : ergo quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo majore lætitia nosmet contemplabimur sive (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus) eo magis gloriabimur. Q.E.D.

We try (by IIIP33 [Reciprocity of Likeness]) as much as we are able that the beloved one might love us in return, that is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) that the beloved one is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us. Thus the more that we imagine that the beloved one has been affected with greater joy from our cause, the more this effort is aided that is (by IIIP11 with IIIP11S [Good for Body, Good for Mind]) the more we are affected with joy. But since from this we are joyous because we affect someone like us with joy, then we view ourselves with joy (by IIIP30 [Looking at Others Looking at Us]): thus, the greater the emotion by which we imagine that the beloved one has been affected with respect to us, the greater our joy we will contemplate ourselves or (by IIIP30S) the more we will boast.