Cum mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.
When the mind imagines its own impotence, it is depressed by it.
DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat sive de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (per propositionem præcedentem). Cum itaque dicimus quod mens dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod dum mens aliquid imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam ponit, hic ejus conatus coercetur sive (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) quod ipsa contristatur. Q.E.D.
The essence of the mind affirms only that which the mind is and is able or from the nature of the mind is to imagine things in such a way which support the potential of its acting (by IIIP54). Since thus we say that the mind as long as it contemplates itself, imagines its own impotence, we say nothing other than that as long as the mind attempts to imagine something which supports its potential of acting, this efforting of it is compelled or (by IIIP11S) is depressed by itself.
COROLLARIUM: Hæc tristitia magis ac magis fovetur si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac corollarium propositionis 53 hujus.
This sadness is more and more nurtured if one imagines oneself faulted by others; which in the same way is demonstrated from IIIP53C.
SCHOLIUM: Hæc tristitia concomitante idea nostræ imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur; lætitia autem quæ ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur. Et quoniam hæc toties repetitur quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit ut unusquisque facta sua narrare suique tam corporis quam animi vires ostentare gestiat et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur homines natura esse invidos (vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus) sive ob suorum æqualium imbecillitatem gaudere et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari. Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur toties lætitia (per propositionem 53 hujus) afficitur et eo majore quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur hoc est (per illa quæ in scholio I propositionis 40 partis II dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest. Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit quando aliquid in se contemplatur quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit et contra contristabitur si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per propositionem 28 hujus) amovere conabitur idque suorum æqualium actiones perperam interpretando vel suas quantum potest adornando. Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidiæ stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.
This sadness accompanied by the idea of our weakness is called humility; moreover joy which arises from contemplation of ourselves is called self-love or acquiescence in oneself. And since this just as often as it is repeated so often does a person contemplate ones own virtues or power of acting, thus from this also it happens that each and every person is eager to tell ones doings and to show strength of the body as well as of the mind and, so, people are annoying to each other on this account. From which again it follows that people are naturally jealous (see IIIP24 and IIIP32S) or to rejoice at weakness equal to themselves and, in contrast, to be saddened on account of the strength of others. For whenever each and every one imagines ones one action so then is affected with joy (by IIIP53) and the greater the actions one imagines them to express more of perfection and the more distinctly the same, that is (by that said in IIP40SI) the more one is able to distinguish the same things from other and to be contemplated as singular things. Therefore each and every one will rejoice maximally then by the contemplation of oneself when something is contemplated in oneself which is denied to the others. But if it affirms something about oneself, it refers to the universal idea of a person or an animal, one will not rejoice so greatly and in contrast one is saddened if one imagines that ones own actions are compared to the stupidities of others, then indeed one will try to remove the sadness (by IIIP28) and by interpreting wrongly it as actions of ones own equals or by adorning ones own as much as one is able. Thus, it appears that people are by nature inclined to hatred and envy to which education itself approaches. For parents are accustomed to motivate children towards virtue by only the stimulus of honor or envy. But perhaps a scruple remains because we admire the virtues of people not infrequently and respect them. Thus I will add a following corollary so that I may remove this.
COROLLARIUM: Nemo virtutem alicui nisi æquali invidet.
No one envies the virtue of another unless one is an equal.
DEMONSTRATIO: Invidia est ipsum odium (vide scholium propositionis 24 hujus) sive (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) affectio qua hominis agendi potentia seu conatus coercetur. At homo (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) nihil agere conatur neque cupit nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest; ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu (quod idem est) virtutem prædicari cupiet quæ naturæ alterius est propria et suæ aliena adeoque ejus cupiditas coerceri hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) ipse contristari nequit ex eo quod aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit. At quidem suo æquali qui cum ipso ejusdem naturæ supponitur. Q.E.D.
Envy is hatred itself (see IIIP24S) or (by IIIP13S) sadness, that is (by IIIP11S) an affect by which the potential of a person's acting or efforting is restrained. By a person (by IIIP9S) tries to do nother and desires nothing unless one is able to follow by one's given nature; thus a person desires no potential of doing or (what is the same thing) virtue to be proclaimed which is proper of another nature and different than oneself to such a degree that one's greed is restrained, that is (by IIIP11S) says that one is saddened from which one contemplates some virtue is someone dissimilar to oneself and consequently might not be able to envy that person. But indeed it is supposed to be one's equal who with the same nature.
SCHOLIUM: Cum igitur supra in scholio propositionis 52 hujus partis dixerimus nos hominem venerari ex eo quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem etc. admiramur, id fit (ut ex ipsa propositione patet) quia has virtutes ei singulariter inesse et non ut nostræ naturæ communes imaginamur adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus quam arboribus altitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem etc.
Therefore although above in IIIP52S we said that we venerate a person because we admire that person's prudence, fortitude, etc. it happens (as is evident from the proposition itself) since we imagine those virtues to be singular in that person and not as our common nature to such a degree that we do not envy these same more than the height of the trees or the bravery of the lions.
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