Spinoza's Ethics: III.P29 - Influence of Opinion of Others

Nos id omne etiam agere conabimur quod homines cum lætitia aspicere imaginamur et contra id agere aversabimur quod homines aversari imaginamur.

We will try to even do everything which we imagine that humans regard with joy and conversely will avoid doing what we imagine humans avoid.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo quod imaginamur homines aliquid amare vel odio habere, nos idem amabimus vel odio habebimus (per propositionem 27 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) eo ipso ejus rei præsentia lætabimur vel contristabimur adeoque (per præcedentem propositionem) id omne quod homines amare sive cum lætitia aspicere imaginamur, conabimur agere etc. Q.E.D.

From that because we imagine that humans have love or hatred towards something, then we will have the same love or hatred (by IIIP27), that is (by IIIP13S) by that itself by whose presence we will be overjoyed or saddened to such an extent (by the preceding proposition) everything which we imagine that humans love or view with joy, we will try to do etc.

SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi ea sola de causa ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur ambitio præsertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quædam agamus vel omittamus; alias humanitas appellari solet. Deinde lætitiam qua alterius actionem qua nos conatus est delectari, imaginamur, laudem voco; tristitiam vero qua contra ejusdem actionem aversamur, vituperium voco.

This effort for doing something and even omitting things from the sole cause that we are pleasing to humans, is called ambition especially as much as to the extent we try to heavily please the crowd so that our or alternately damned certain things we do or omit; is accustomed to be called humanity of another. Next joy which the action of another which is our effort is to be desired, we imagine, I call praise; truly sadness which we avoid the action of the same, I call vituperation.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P28 - Following Beliefs For Power

Spinoza argues here that we act on what we imagine to increase our power, our joy and that we act against what we imagine to decrease our power, our joy. This conatus is our nature and follows accordingly. When people act, they act logically on their beliefs in accordance with the power of their beliefs. 

Id omne quod ad lætitiam conducere imaginamur, conamur promovere ut fiat; quod vero eidem repugnare sive ad tristitiam conducere imaginamur, amovere vel destruere conamur.

Everything which we imagine to lead to joy, we try to promote so that it happens; that which truly we imagine to repulse (joy) or lead to sadness, we try to remove or destroy.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quod ad lætitiam conducere imaginamur, quantum possumus imaginari conamur (per propositionem 12 hujus) hoc est (per propositionem 17 partis II) id quantum possumus conabimur ut præsens sive ut actu existens contemplari. Sed mentis conatus seu potentia in cogitando æqualis et simul natura est cum corporis conatu seu potentia in agendo (ut clare sequitur ex corollario propositionis 7 et corollario propositionis 11 partis II) : ergo ut id existat absolute conamur sive (quod per scholium propositionis 9 hujus idem est) appetimus et intendimus; quod erat primum. Deinde si id quod tristitiæ causam esse credimus hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) si id quod odio habemus, destrui imaginamur, lætabimur (per propositionem 20 hujus) adeoque idem (per primam hujus partem) conabimur destruere sive (per propositionem 13 hujus) a nobis amovere ne ipsum ut præsens contemplemur, quod erat secundum. Ergo id omne quod ad lætitiam etc. Q.E.D. 

What we imagine to lead to joy, we try as much as we can to imagine (by IIIP12), that is (by IIP17) that we will try as much as we can to contemplate it as present or as actually existing. But the effort of the mind or power in thinking is equal to and at the same in nature with the effort of the body or power in acting (as clearly followed from IIP7C and IIP11C): thus as it exists absolutely we try or (what by IIIP9S is the same) we desire and intend; which was first. Next if that which is what we believe to be the cause of sadness, that is (by IIIP13S) if what we have with hatred, we imagine to be destroyed, we will be overjoyed (by IIIP20) to such a degree the same (by III first part) we will try to destroy or (by IIIP13) remove from ourselves so that we do not contemplate (it) as present, which was following. Thus everything which to joy, etc.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P27 - Empathy

We are familiar with a technique of beginning a story (or movie) by getting the reader (or viewer) to sympathize with the subject through establishing something similar to the reader (or viewer). Here Spinoza outlines the mechanism by which that technique operates. As we experience modifications of our bodies, our mind generates representative ideas in parallel with those modifications. Some of these ideas involve bodies which we perceive to be similar to our own. This perceived similarity has the power to generate an extension of our identity so powerful that perceived emotions become imitatively our own emotions.

Ex eo quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.

In a case when we imagine a thing similar to us - even which we have pursued with no (prior) emotion, to be affected by some emotion, we are affected by a thing itself similar to the emotion.

DEMONSTRATIO: Rerum imagines sunt corporis humani affectiones quarum ideæ corpora externa veluti nobis præsentia repræsentant (per scholium propositionis 17 partis II) hoc est (per propositionem 16 partis II) quarum ideæ naturam nostri corporis et simul præsentem externi corporis naturam involvunt. Si igitur corporis externi natura similis sit naturæ nostri corporis, tum idea corporis externi quod imaginamur affectionem nostri corporis involvet similem affectioni corporis externi et consequenter si aliquem nobis similem aliquo affectu affectum imaginamur, hæc imaginatio affectionem nostri corporis huic affectui similem exprimet adeoque ex hoc quod rem aliquam nobis similem aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, simili cum ipsa affectu afficimur. Quod si rem nobis similem odio habeamus, eatenus (per propositionem 23 hujus) contrario affectu cum ipsa afficiemur, non autem simili. Q.E.D.

The images of things are modifications of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies just as things present to ourselves (by IIP17S), that is (by IIP16) whose ideas involve the nature of our body and at the same time the presenting nature of the external body. If therefore the nature of the external body is similar to the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body which we imagine involves a modification of our body similar to the modification of the external body and consequently if we imagine anyone similar to us affected by some emotion, this imagination expresses a modification of our body similar to this emotion and to such an extent from this because we imagine some thing similar to us to be affected by some emotion, we are affected similarly with the emotion itself. Since if we have hatred to a thing similar to us, just so much (by IIIP23) are we affected contrarily with the affect itself, not at all like it.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc affectuum imitatio quando ad tristitiam refertur, vocatur commiseratio (de qua vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus) sed ad cupiditatem relata æmulatio, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam alicujus rei cupiditas quæ in nobis ingeneratur ex eo quod alios nobis similes eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.

This imitation of the emotions when it refers to sadness is called pity (concerning which see IIIP22S) but when related to desire (is called) emulation, which then is nothing other than the desire of something else which is implanted in us from where because we imagine others similar to us have the same desire.

COROLLARIUM I: Si aliquem quem nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, imaginamur lætitia afficere rem nobis similem, amore erga eundem afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur eandem tristitia afficere, odio erga ipsum afficiemur.

If we imagine anyone, to whom we have attended with no emotion, to affect someone similar to us with joy, we are affected by love towards this same person. If, in contrast, we imagine this same person to affect that same one with sadness, we are affected with hatred towards this self.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hoc eodem modo ex propositione præcedenti demonstratur ac propositio 22 hujus ex propositione 21.

This is demonstrated in the same way from the preceding proposition (IIIP27) as IIIP22 (is demonstrated) from IIIP21.

COROLLARIUM II: Rem cujus nos miseret, odio habere non possumus ex eo quod ipsius miseria nos tristitia afficit.

A thing which moves us to pity we are not able to hate in which case because its suffering affects us with sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim ex eo nos eandem odio habere possemus, tum (per propositionem 23 hujus) ex ipsius tristitia lætaremur, quod est contra hypothesin.

For if from which we are able to have hatred for the same thing, then (by IIIP23) we might be joyful from sadness itself, which is contrary to hypothesis.

COROLLARIUM III: Rem cujus nos miseret, a miseria quantum possumus liberare conabimur.

A thing which moves us to pity, we will try to free from suffering as much as we are able.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id quod rem cujus nos miseret, tristitia afficit, nos simili etiam tristitia afficit (per propositionem præcedentem) adeoque omne id quod ejus rei existentiam tollit sive quod rem destruit, comminisci conabimur (per propositionem 13 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) id destruere appetemus sive ad id destruendum determinabimur atque adeo rem cujus miseremur, a sua miseria liberare conabimur. Q.E.D.

That which affects with sadness a thing which moves us to pity, also affects us with a similar sadness,  (by IIIP27) to such a degree that we will try to invent everything which takes away the existence of the thing or which destroys the thing, (by IIIP13), that is (by IIIP9S) we seek to destroy or for its destruction we will be determined and to such a degree we will try to free which thing we pity from misery.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi qui ex eo oritur quod rei in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, benevolentia vocatur, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. Cæterum de amore et odio erga illum qui rei quam nobis similem esse imaginamur, bene aut male fecit, vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus.

This will or appetite for doing good which arises from that which engenders pity in us for the thing into which we wish to confer good, is called benevolence, which next nothing is other than desire arising from pity. Of the rest about love and hatred towards who to the thing which we imagine is similar to us, does good or bad, see IIIP22S. 

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P26 - Hate Bias

As usual, Spinoza's scholia provide more clarity than the cumbersome geometric method and this scholium in no exception. His reasoning in this proposition follows from the prior proposition. I have experienced much of what he describes and modern psychology confirms it. However, Spinoza goes on in the scholium to what he regards as the real peril - fooling oneself. It appears that these biases are not really a problem, but in fact appear to support and encourage our endeavors. But when our biases drive us to regard ourselves too highly, it becomes a species of madness. It is interesting that he does not comment on the opposite  of regarding ourselves too lowly. This contrast he does with others in the case of honor and disdain. I believe that Spinoza implies that even when we state we view ourselves lowly, we are, in fact, regarding ourselves highly for regarding ourselves lowly - a form of Paul's "I'm the chief of sinners."

Id omne de re quam odio habemus, affirmare conamur quod ipsam tristitia afficere imaginamur et id contra negare quod ipsam lætitia afficere imaginamur.

Everything about which we have hatred, we try to affirm what we imagine to affect the thing itself with sadness and on the other hand to deny what we imagine affects the thing itself with joy.

DEMONSTRATIO: Sequitur hæc propositio ex propositione 23 ut præcedens ex propositione 21 hujus.

This proposition follows from IIIP23 as that follows from IIIP21.

SCHOLIUM: His videmus facile contingere ut homo de se deque re amata plus justo et contra de re quam odit, minus justo sentiat, quæ quidem imaginatio quando ipsum hominem respicit qui de se plus justo sentit, superbia vocatur et species delirii est quia homo oculis apertis somniat se omnia illa posse quæ sola imaginatione assequitur quæque propterea veluti realia contemplatur iisque exultat quamdiu ea imaginari non potest quæ horum existentiam secludunt et ipsius agendi potentiam determinant. Est igitur superbia lætitia ex eo orta quod homo de se plus justo sentit. Deinde lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod homo de alio plus justo sentit, existimatio vocatur et illa denique despectus quæ ex eo oritur quod de alio minus justo sentit.

By these we see easily it happens that a person concerning oneself and a beloved thing thinks more than is just and, on the other hand, about a thing which one hates, (thinks) less than just; which indeed is called pride, when the imagination regards ones own person who thinks more about oneself more than is just, and is a species of madness because the person dreams with open eyes that one is able [to do] all those things which follow from the imagination alone on account of contemplating whatever things just as if real and is thrilled by those things for as long as that person is not able to imagine those things which exclude their existence and limit the potential of one's doing. Therefore pride is a joy which arises from the case in which a person feels about oneself more than just. Next, the joy which arises from the case in which a person feels more than just about another person, is called honor and that finally (is called) disdain which arises from the case in which one feels less than just about another.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P25 - Love Bias

Here is a proposition that I have observed in action during meditation - my recollections of joyful occasions are much easier to access than my recollections of painful occasions. I had been aware of this tendency and tried to follow the maxim, "if you can feel it, you can heal it." However, I noticed a limitation of my ability to bring those painful memories to mind. I attributed this to my ego's role of self-preservation as well as self-serving biases. Spinoza characterizes this as a function of our conatus. 

Id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel rem amatam lætitia afficere imaginamur et contra id omne negare quod nos vel rem amatam tristitia afficere imaginamur.

We try to affirm everything about ourselves and about a beloved thing which we imagine to affect ourselves or a beloved thing with joy and, on the other hand, to deny everything which we imagine to affect ourselves or a beloved thing with sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quod rem amatam lætitia vel tristitia afficere imaginamur, id nos lætitia vel tristitia afficit (per propositionem 21 hujus). At mens (per propositionem 12 hujus) ea quæ nos lætitia afficiunt, quantum potest conatur imaginari hoc est (per propositionem 17 partis II et ejus corollarium) ut præsentia contemplari et contra (per propositionem 13 hujus) quæ nos tristitia afficiunt, eorum existentiam secludere; ergo id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel rem amatam lætitia afficere imaginamur et contra. Q.E.D.

That which we imagine to affect a beloved thing with joy or sadness, that thing affects us with joy or sadness (by IIIP21). But the mind (by IIIP12) tries as much as it is able to imagine things which affect us with joy, that is (by IIP17 and IIP17C) so as to contemplate as present and, on the other hand (by IIIP13) things which affect us with sadness, to exclude the existence of; thus we try to affirm everything about ourselves and a beloved thing which we imagine to affect ourselves or a beloved thing with joy and also the opposite. 

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P24 - Hatred Gives Opposite to Others

Si aliquem imaginamur lætitia afficere rem quam odio habemus, odio etiam erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem rem afficere, amore erga ipsum afficiemur.

If we imagine anyone affects with joy the thing which we hate, also we will be affected with hatred toward it. On the other hand if we imagine the same person affects the same thing with sadness, we will be affected by love toward itself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Demonstratur eodem modo hæc propositio ac propositio 22 hujus, quam vide.

It is shown in the same way this proposition and IIIP22, which you check out.

SCHOLIUM: Hi et similes odii affectus ad invidiam referuntur, quæ propterea nihil aliud est quam ipsum odium quatenus id consideratur hominem ita disponere ut malo alterius gaudeat et contra ut ejusdem bono contristetur.

These and similar affects of hatred are borne to jealousy, which beside nothing other than hatred itself insofar as it is considered that the human thus takes joy to arrange as hate to another and in contrast saddened at the good of the same.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P23 - Hatred Gives Opposite

Qui id quod odio habet, tristitia affectum imaginatur, lætabitur; si contra idem lætitia affectum esse imaginetur, contristabitur et uterque hic affectus major aut minor erit prout ejus contrarius major aut minor est in eo quod odio habet.

Whoever has a thing which is with hatred, if the person imagines the thing affected with sadness, will rejoice; if, on the other hand, the person imagines the same thing to be affected with joy, will be anguished and each of these affects will be more or less the more or less it is contrary in the thing which is with hatred.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quatenus res odiosa tristitia afficitur eatenus destruitur et eo magis quo majore tristitia afficitur (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus). Qui igitur (per propositionem 20 hujus) rem quam odio habet, tristitia affici imaginatur, lætitia contra afficietur et eo majore quo majore tristitia rem odiosam affectam esse imaginatur; quod erat primum. Deinde lætitia existentiam rei lætæ ponit (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus) et eo magis quo major lætitia concipitur. Si quis eum quem odio habet, lætitia affectum imaginatur, hæc imaginatio (per propositionem 13 hujus) ejusdem conatum coercebit hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) is qui odio habet, tristitia afficietur etc. Q.E.D.

Insofar as the hated thing is affected with sadness insofar as it is destroyed and the more the greater it is affected with sadness (by IIIP11S). Therefore who (by IIIP20) imagines a thing which is hated to be affected with sadness, on the other hand is affected with joy and the greater it is the more he imagines the hated thing to be affected with sadness; this was the first. Next he places with joy the existence of the joyful thing (by the same IIIP11S) and the more he conceives it the greater the joy. If anyone imagines the thing which he hates affected with joy, this imagination (by IIIP13) will restrain the person's affect, that is (by IIIP11S) who has hatred, is affected with sadness etc.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc lætitia vix solida et absque ullo animi conflictu esse potest. Nam (ut statim in propositione 27 hujus ostendam) quatenus rem sibi similem tristitiæ affectu affici imaginatur eatenus contristari debet et contra si eandem lætitia affici imaginetur. Sed hic ad solum odium attendimus.

This joy scarcely is able to be solid and away from any conflict of mind. For (as I will show shortly in IIIP27) insofar it is imagined that a thing similar to itself to be affected with an emotion of sadness just so far ought it be saddened and on the other hand if it is imagined that the same is affected with joy. But we will attend here to hatred alone.