III.D1 - Desire Defined

DEFINITIONES I. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.

Desire is the essence itself of a person insofar as from whatsoever one's given affection is determined to be conceived for doing something.

EXPLICATIO: Diximus supra in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis cupiditatem esse appetitum cum ejusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem scholio etiam monui me revera inter humanum appetitum et cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque atque adeo ne tautologiam committere viderer, cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui sed eandem ita definire studui ut omnes humanæ naturæ conatus quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem. Potueram enim dicere cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum sed ex hac definitione (per propositionem 23 partis II) non sequeretur quod mens possit suæ cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur ut hujus conscientiæ causam involverem, necesse fuit (per eandem propositionem) addere "quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata etc.". Nam per affectionem humanæ essentiæ quamcunque ejusdem essentiæ constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata sive quod ipsa per solum cogitationis sive per solum extensionis attributum concipiatur sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscunque conatus, impetus, appetitus et volitiones, qui pro varia ejusdem hominis constitutione varii et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi sunt ut homo diversimode trahatur et quo se vertat, nesciat.

We said above in IIIP9 that desire is appetite with consciousness of the same; further appetite is the essence of a person itself insofar as it is determined for doing things which promote the conservation of oneself. But in the same note, I also warned that I actually knew no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a person might be aware of one's appetite or not, nevertheless the appetite remains one and the same and to such an extent lest I seem to commit a tautology, I do not wish to explain desire by appetite but in this regard have been eager to define the same thing so that every effort of human nature which we might signify by the name of appetite, will, desire or impulse, I might understand by one name. For I had been able to say that desire is the essence itself of a person insofar as it is determined to be conceived for doing something but from this definition (by IIP23) it might not follow because the mind is able to be aware of its own desire or appetite. So since I involved the cause of this awareness, it was necessary (by the same proposition) to add "insofar as it is determined by whatsoever is one's affection etc." For by affection of a person's essence, we understand whatsoever constitution of one's essence, whether it be innate or conceived as whatever through cognition alone or through the attribute of extension alone or finally it might refer to both at the same time. So here I understand by the name of desire of a person whatever efforts, impulses, appetites and wills, which vary by the various constitution of each person and not rarely to the extent that they are opposed in turn for each person so that a person is dragged by divergences and by what one is turned, one does not know.