III.P59

Inter omnes affectus qui ad mentem quatenus agit referuntur, nulli alii sunt quam qui ad lætitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur.

Among all affects which refer to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none other than which refer to joy or desire.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, lætitiam vel tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. Per tristitiam autem intelligimus quod mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus et ejus scholium) adeoque mens quatenus contristatur eatenus ejus intelligendi hoc est ejus agendi potentia (per propositionem 1 hujus) minuitur vel coercetur adeoque nulli tristitiæ affectus ad mentem referri possunt quatenus agit sed tantum affectus lætitiæ et cupiditatis qui (per propositionem præcedentem) eatenus etiam ad mentem referuntur. Q.E.D.

All affects refer to desire, joy or sadness as whose definitions which we have given do show. By sadness, moreover, we understand that which lessens or restrains the potential power of the mind's thinking (by IIIP11 and IIIP11S) to such a degree that the mind insofar as it is saddened just as much as its understanding, that is, its potential power of acting (by IIIP1) is lessened or restrained to such an extent that no affect of sadness can refer to the mind insofar as it acts but only affects of joy and desire which (by IIIP58) to such also refer to the mind.

SCHOLIUM: Omnes actiones quæ sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem referuntur quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare et sibi amicitia jungere. Eas itaque actiones quæ solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem et quæ alterius etiam utile intendunt ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis præsentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc. species generositatis sunt. Atque his puto me præcipuos affectus animique fluctuationes quæ ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum nempe cupiditatis, lætitiæ et tristitiæ oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet nos a causis externis multis modis agitari nosque perinde ut maris undæ a contrariis ventis agitatæ fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios. 

All actions which follow from the affects which refer to the mind insofar as it understands, I refer to bravery which I distinguish between animosity and generosity. For by animosity, I understand desire by which each and everyone tries to persevere to be oneself solely from the dictate of reason. By generosity, morever, I understand desire by which each and everyone tries to help other people and to join to oneself by friendship solely from the dictate of reason. Thus, these actions which I refer to animosity which intend solely for the use of the agent and to generosity which also intend for the use of others. Thus, temperance, sobriety and presence of mind in danger are species of animosity; further those of modesty, mercy etc are species of generosity. And with these I think that I have shown the primary affect and fluctuations of mood which arise from the composition of the three primitive affects, namely, desire, joy and sadness, to have explained through the three primary causes.

At dixi me præcipuos tantum, non omnes qui dari possunt animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via qua supra procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse junctum p™nitentiæ, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo affectus tot modis alios cum aliis posse componi indeque tot variationes oriri ut nullo numero definiri queant. Sed ad meum institutum præcipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit nam reliqui quos omisi plus curiositatis quam utilitatis haberent. Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat quod scilicet sæpissime contingit dum re quam appetebamus fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem a qua aliter determinatur et aliæ rerum imagines in eo excitantur et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Exempli gratia cum aliquid quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore jam aliter disposito ejusdem cibi imago quia ipse præsens adest, fomentetur et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi, huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit et consequenter cibi quem appetebamus, præsentia odiosa erit et hoc est quod fastidium et tædium vocamus. Cæterum corporis affectiones externas quæ in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc. neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quædam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.