Spinoza's Ethics: IIP.33: Positive and False are Exclusive

Here Spinoza ties together the notions of positivity as a structural form of truth in the attribute of thought that forms a relationship to existence in the attribute of extension. Just as existence precludes non-existence within God, so too positivity precludes falsehood within God.

Nihil in ideis positivum est propter quod falsæ dicuntur.

Nothing is positive in ideas on account of which they are deemed false.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si negas, concipe si fieri potest, modum positivum cogitandi qui formam erroris sive falsitatis constituat. Hic cogitandi modus non potest esse in Deo (per propositionem præcedentem); extra Deum autem etiam nec esse nec concipi potest (per propositionem 15 partis I). Atque adeo nihil potest dari positivum in ideis propter quod falsæ dicuntur. Q.E.D.

If you deny this, conceive if it is possible, a positive mode of understanding which constitutes the form of error or falsity. This mode of understanding is not possible in God (by IIP32); moreover, beyond God it is even unable to be or be conceived (IP15). And so nothing is able to be positive in ideas on account of which they are deemed false.

Spinoza's Ethics: IIP.32: God's Ideas are True

At this point, Spinoza shifts from a rigorous focus on the generally inadequate ideas by which we operate to a recognition that infinite ideas are adequate. Here he brings us back to the perfection of Part I while holding the mind of Part II as of the fabric of perfection. In this way, Spinoza does not join the chorus of skeptics who argue for a nature which is unruly and not subject to reason. Instead, he agrees with skeptics concerning the limitations of our capacity for understanding while affirming the inherent reason structure of the world around us.

Omnes ideæ quatenus ad Deum referuntur, veræ sunt.

All ideas insofar as they refer to God are true.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes enim ideæ quæ in Deo sunt, cum suis ideatis omnino conveniunt (per corollarium propositionis 7 hujus) adeoque (per axioma 6 partis I) omnes veræ sunt. Q.E.D.

For all ideas which are in God since they correspond completely with their objects (by IIP7C) to such an extent (by IA6) they are all true.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P31: Duration of Singular Things

Here Spinoza extends the reasoning that denies our knowledge of the extent of our lives to other things. Despite our best efforts of understanding, we are simply limited by our inability to have full knowledge of all of the causal chains operating.

Nos de duratione rerum singularium quæ extra nos sunt, nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus.

We are able to have nothing except a completely inadequate understanding of the duration of singular things which are outside us.

DEMONSTRATIO: Unaquæque enim res singularis sicuti humanum corpus ab alia re singulari determinari debet ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione et hæc iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum (per propositionem 28 partis I). Cum autem ex hac communi rerum singularium proprietate in præcedenti propositione demonstraverimus nos de duratione nostri corporis non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere, ergo hoc idem de rerum singularium duratione erit concludendum quod scilicet ejus non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus. Q.E.D.

For whatsoever singular thing so as the human body ought to be determined from another singular thing to exist and operate by a certain and determined reason and this again from another and thus into infinity (by IP28). Moreover since we have demonstrated from this common property of singular things in the preceding proposition that we do not have anything concerning the duration of our body except a completely inadequate understanding, therefore this same ought to be concluded concerning the duration of singular things because just as this we are not able to have anything except an inadequate understanding.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. Nam de earum duratione nullam adæquatam cognitionem habere possumus (per propositionem præcedentem) et hoc est id quod per rerum contingentiam et corruptionis possibilitatem nobis est intelligendum (vide scholium I propositionis 33 partis I). Nam (per propositionem 29 partis I) præter hoc nullum datur contingens.

From this it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we are able to have no adequate understanding of the duration of these (by IIP30) and that is we ought to know that by the contingency and possibility of corruption of things (see IP33S1). For (by IP29), except this nothing is contingent.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P30: Idea of the Duration of the Body

Here Spinoza addresses a fundamental concern for every person: knowing the extent of our lives. He does not diminish the quest here, but simply establishes that it is, so to speak, a closed book. The knowledge of an effect is dependent on its cause. Since the duration of our lives does not depend on our essence or on God, but only on an infinite chain of causality, knowledge of all things would be the requirement for an adequate understanding of the extent of our lives.

Nos de duratione nostri corporis nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus.

We are able to have nothing except a completely inadequate understanding about the duration of our body.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nostri corporis duratio ab ejus essentia non dependet (per axioma 1 hujus) nec etiam ab absoluta Dei natura (per propositionem 21 partis I). Sed (per propositionem 28 partis I) ad existendum et operandum determinatur a talibus causis quæ etiam ab aliis determinatæ sunt ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione et hæ iterum ab aliis et sic in infinitum. Nostri igitur corporis duratio a communi naturæ ordine et rerum constitutione pendet. Qua autem ratione constitutæ sint, ejus rei adæquata cognitio datur in Deo quatenus earum omnium ideas et non quatenus tantum humani corporis ideam habet (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus); quare cognitio durationis nostri corporis est in Deo admodum inadæquata quatenus tantum naturam mentis humanæ constituere consideratur hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) hæc cognitio est in nostra mente admodum inadæquata. Q.E.D. 

The duration of our body is not dependent on its essence (by IIA1) and not even on the absolute nature of God (by IP21). But (by IP28) it is determined to exist and operate from such causes which are determined by others to exist and to operate by a clear and determined reason and these again from others and thus into infinity. Therefore, the duration of our body depends on the common order of nature and the constitution of things. Moreover, by which reason things are constituted, an adequate understanding of its thing is given in God insofar as ideas of all things and not insofar as it has such idea of the human body (by IIP9C); for what reason, the understanding of the duration of our body is in God is completely inadequate insofar as it is considered to constitute such nature of the human mind, that is (by IIP11C) this understanding is completely inadequate in our mind.

Time Under Spinoza's Attributes

Within Spinoza's broad architecture of reality or being, he articulates that as humans we understand reality through two attributes - extending and thinking - or as I like to think of it - objective and subjective. His discussions on time are limited, but it does seem relevant that Einstein's physics revolution could be related to Spinoza's two attributes. Time could be considered objective where space-time distortion is non-existent versus subjective where space-time distortions are significant. This example also allows for the expanded sense of the attribute of thinking or subjectivity - it is not of the imagination but is real within its attribute.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P29: Limits of Adequate Understanding

In this proposition, Spinoza outlines the constraints for adequate understanding. Given our tendency to cognitive illusion, Spinoza outlines that these ideas are not true in the sense that they do not completely reflect the object. However, despite these "external" constraints, Spinoza indicates that a pathway to understanding exists through an "internal" process.

Idea ideæ cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adæquatam humanæ mentis cognitionem non involvit.

Translated as,

The idea of the idea of whatsoever modification of the human body does not involve an adequate understanding of the human mind.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea enim affectionis corporis humani (per propositionem 27 hujus) adæquatam ipsius corporis cognitionem non involvit sive ejus naturam adæquate non exprimit hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) cum natura mentis non convenit adæquate adeoque (per axioma 6 partis I) hujus ideæ idea adæquate humanæ mentis naturam non exprimit sive adæquatam ejus cognitionem non involvit. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For the idea of a modification of the human body (by IIP27) does not involve the adequate understanding of the body itself or does not express its nature adequately, that is (by IIP13) since the nature of the mind does not correlate adequately to such a degree (by IA6) that the idea of this idea does not express the nature of the human mind adequately or does not involve an adequate understanding of it.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem humanam quoties ex communi naturæ ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adæquatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem. Nam mens se ipsam non cognoscit nisi quatenus ideas affectionum corporis percipit (per propositionem 23 hujus). Corpus autem suum (per propositionem 19 hujus) non percipit nisi per ipsas affectionum ideas per quas etiam tantum (per propositionem 26 hujus) corpora externa percipit atque adeo quatenus eas habet, nec sui ipsius (per propositionem 29 hujus) nec sui corporis (per propositionem 27 hujus) nec corporum externorum (per propositionem 25 hujus) habet adæquatam cognitionem sed tantum (per propositionem 28 hujus cum ejus scholio) mutilatam et confusam. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Here it follows that as much as the human mind perceives things from the common order of nature, that it does not have an adequate understanding of itself and of its body and of external bodies but one so confused and mutilated. For the mind does not understand itself unless insofar as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body (by IIP23). Moreover, it does not perceive its own body (by IIP19) unless through ideas themselves of modifications by which it also to this extent perceives (by IIP26) external bodies and to such a degree insofar it has them and not of itself (by IIP29) and not of its body (by IIP27) and not of external bodies (by IIP25) does it have an adequate understanding but one so (by IIP28S) mutilated and confused.

SCHOLIUM: Dico expresse quod mens nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adæquatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam cognitionem habeat quoties ex communi naturæ ordine res percipit hoc est quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum; quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam.

Translated as,

I say expressly because the mind may have neither of itself nor of its body nor of external bodies an adequate understanding but one so confused and mutilated as often as it perceives things from the common order of nature, that is as often as it is determined externally, from the happenstance occasion of things of course, to this or that idea and not as often internally, from which of course because it contemplates more things at the same time, it is determined to understanding correlations, differences and oppositions of the same things; for as often in this or that way it is disposed internally, then a thing is beheld clearly and distinctly, as I show below.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P28: Human mind in itself is an inadequate idea

Spinoza is setting out this proposition in order to distinguish the adequacy of the idea of the human body versus the ideas of the modifications of the human. The idea of the human body, insofar as it is related to immediacy and experience, is adequate. This concept is similar to that of a person's feelings are true insofar as they are feelings. However, the modifications of the human body which give rise to this experience are not adequate, that is, they do not have the same level of truth. In the same way as a person's feelings are true, the same person can be completely mistaken as to the nature of the causality of feelings. Here Spinoza is setting out the wisdom of honoring one's feelings in themselves, but having skepticism as to the cause of those feelings - no matter how clear that causality might seem.

Ideæ affectionum corporis humani quatenus ad humanam mentem tantum referuntur, non sunt claræ et distinctæ sed confusæ.

Translated as,

The ideas of the modifications of the human body insofar as they refer only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct but confused.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ideæ enim affectionum corporis humani tam corporum externorum quam ipsius humani corporis naturam involvunt (per propositionem 16 hujus) nec tantum corporis humani sed ejus etiam partium naturam involvere debent; affectiones namque modi sunt (per postulatum 3) quibus partes corporis humani et consequenter totum corpus afficitur. At (per propositiones 24 et 25 hujus) corporum externorum adæquata cognitio ut et partium corpus humanum componentium in Deo non est quatenus humana mente sed quatenus aliis ideis affectus consideratur. Sunt ergo hæ affectionum ideæ quatenus ad solam humanam mentem referuntur, veluti consequentiæ absque præmissis hoc est (ut per se notum) ideæ confusæ. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For the ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature not only of the external bodies but also of the human body itself (by IIP16) and must involve the nature of not only of the human body but also of its parts. For the modifications are modes (by Postulate 3) by which the parts of the human body is affected and consequently the whole body. But (by IIP24 and IIP25) the adequate understanding of external bodies is not in God as the human body of component parts insofar as it considered by the human mind but insofar as an affect by other ideas. Therefore these are ideas of modifications insofar as they refer only to the human mind, just as of consequences away from premises, that is (as noted through itself) confused ideas.

SCHOLIUM: Idea quæ naturam mentis humanæ constituit, demonstratur eodem modo non esse, in se sola considerata, clara et distincta, ut etiam idea mentis humanæ et ideæ idearum affectionum corporis humani quatenus ad solam mentem referuntur, quod unusquisque facile videre potest.

Translated as,

The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind, is demonstrated in this way that it is not clear and distinct, considered in itself, as also the idea of the human mind and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body insofar as they refer to the mind alone which each and every person is easily able to see.