Qui aliquem odio habet, ei malum inferre conabitur nisi ex eo majus sibi malum oriri timeat et contra qui aliquem amat, ei eadem lege benefacere conabitur.
Whoever has hatred towards someone, will try to inflict a bad thing on that one unless from that [action] one fears a greater bad to oneself would arise and in contrast whoever has love towards someone, will try to do good for that one by the same rule.
DEMONSTRATIO: Aliquem odio habere est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) aliquem ut tristitiæ causam imaginari adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus) is qui aliquem odio habet, eundem amovere vel destruere conabitur. Sed si inde aliquid tristius sive (quod idem est) majus malum sibi timeat idque se vitare posse credit non inferendo ei quem odit malum quod meditabatur, a malo inferendo (per eandem propositionem 28 hujus) abstinere cupiet idque (per propositionem 37 hujus) majore conatu quam quo tenebatur inferendi malum, qui propterea prævalebit, ut volebamus. Secundæ partis demonstratio eodem modo procedit. Ergo qui aliquem odio habet etc. Q.E.D.
To have hatred towards someone is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) someone whom one imagines as the cause of sadness to such an extent (by IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) that the one who has hatred for such a person will try to remove or destroy that person. But if from where some greater sadness or (what is the same) greater evil one might fear to oneself and that one believes that one is able to avoid that harm which one plans by not carrying out against the one whom he hates, from carrying out harm (by the same IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) one might desire to abstain and that (by IIIP37 [Feedback Loop for Desire]) with greater persisting that by which one has held on to carrying out harm, who meanwhile will overcome, as we imparted. The demonstration of the following part proceeds in the same way. Therefore, whoever has hatred of someone etc.
SCHOLIUM: Per bonum hic intelligo omne genus lætitiæ et quicquid porro ad eandem conducit et præcipue id quod desiderio qualecunque illud sit, satisfacit. Per malum autem omne tristitiæ genus et præcipue id quod desiderium frustratur. Supra enim (in scholio propositionis 9 hujus) ostendimus nos nihil cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra id bonum vocamus quod cupimus et consequenter id quod aversamur malum appellamus; quare unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat seu æstimat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius, quid pejus et quid denique optimum quidve pessimum sit. Sic avarus argenti copiam optimum, ejus autem inopiam pessimum judicat. Ambitiosus autem nihil æque ac gloriam cupit et contra nihil æque ac pudorem reformidat. Invido deinde nihil jucundius quam alterius infelicitas et nihil molestius quam aliena felicitas ac sic unusquisque ex suo affectu rem aliquam bonam aut malam, utilem aut inutilem esse judicat. Cæterum hic affectus quo homo ita disponitur ut id quod vult nolit vel ut id quod non vult velit, timor vocatur, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam metus quatenus homo ab eodem disponitur ad malum quod futurum judicat, minore vitandum (vide propositionem 28 hujus). Sed si malum quod timet pudor sit, tum timor appellatur verecundia. Denique si cupiditas malum futurum vitandi coercetur timore alterius mali ita ut quid potius velit, nesciat, tum metus vocatur consternatio præcipue si utrumque malum quod timetur ex maximis sit.
By good here I mean any kind of joy that fulfills and whatever leads to the same and especially that which fulfills whatever desire whatsoever there may be. By bad, moreover, every kind of sadness and especially that which frustrates desire. For above (in IIIP9S [Awareness of Persisting]) we have shown that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good but instead we call it good because we desire it and consequently that which we avoid we call bad; wherefore each and everyone judges or if estimates from ones own emotion what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse and finally what the best and the worst might be. Thus one who is greedy for the fullest supply of silver, moreover judges the worst scarcity of oneself. Moreover nothing is like the ambitious one who desires glory and, in contrast, nothing is like one who dreads shame. Next envy is nothing more pleasing than the unhappiness of another and nothing more annoying than the happiness of another and thus each and every person judges from ones own emotion whether some thing is good or bad, useful or useless. Here the other emotion by which a person is so inclined that which one does not prefer what one wants or prefers that which one does not want, is called fear, which next is nothing other than fear insofar as a person is disinclined from something which one judges to be bad in the future, avoiding less (see IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]). But if it is a bad which one fears might be shame, then that fear is called bashfulness. Next if desire for avoiding a future evil is forced by fear of another evil so that one might wish that instead, one does not know, then the fear is called consternation especially if either of the evils which one fears are from greatest things.
In this proposition, Spinoza outlines the constraining effect of self-interest on regulation of emotion-motivated action. This allows a pathway towards "enlightened selfishness." The concept of how an action may or may not be in our best interest - the so-called "think the drink" concept - has power. Of course, this power is limited relative to the actual desire which, as he addresses in the scholium, can ever go so far as to drive our value frameworks that we assume are universal or at least communally shared. In fact, Spinoza even goes so far as to describe how these value frameworks are singular and rooted in our individual "drugs of choice."
