Spinoza's Ethics: III. Preface

Plerique qui de affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus quæ communes naturæ leges sequuntur sed de rebus quæ extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturæ ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanæ deinde impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causam non communi naturæ potentiæ sed nescio cui naturæ humanæ vitio tribuunt quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur et qui humanæ mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur. Non defuerunt tamen viri præstantissimi (quorum labori et industriæ nos multum debere fatemur) qui de recta vivendi ratione præclara multa scripserint et plena prudentiæ consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo quod sciam determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam crediderit mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare simulque viam ostendere studuisse qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium sed mea quidem sententia nihil præter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt quam intelligere. His sine dubio mirum videbitur quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea quæ rationi repugnare quæque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea hæc est ratio. Nihil in natura fit quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia hoc est naturæ leges et regulæ secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eædem atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcunque naturam intelligendi nempe per leges et regulas naturæ universales. Affectus itaque odii, iræ, invidiæ etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturæ necessitate et virtute consequuntur ac reliqua singularia ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt per quas intelliguntur certasque proprietates habent cognitione nostra æque dignas ac proprietates cujuscunque alterius rei cujus sola contemplatione delectamur. De affectuum itaque natura et viribus ac mentis in eosdem potentia eadem methodo agam qua in præcedentibus de Deo et mente egi et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde ac si quæstio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.

Most who write about the affects and the reason of living of humans do not seem to discuss concerning the natural things which follow the common laws of nature but concerning those which are beyond nature. Indeed they seem to conceive of man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that humanity disrupts the order of nature more than follows (the order of nature) and to have absolute power itself in humanity's actions and not by another is humanity more determined than by itself. Finally the cause of human impotence and inconstancy is not the power of common nature but I do not know to what fault of human nature they attribute than they cry, laugh, condemn whatever most happens, they detest and who know to complain of power of the human mind more eloquently and more forcefully as if it has divinity. Nevertheless the most eminent of people have handed down (for whose labor and industry we confess we owe much) who have written many excellent things concerning the right way of living and have given many plans of wisdom to mortals; yet truly no one has outlined what I know on the nature and power of the affects and what against them the mind is able to do against moderating these. Indeed I know the most celebrated Descartes, of course even he might have believed that the mind has absolute power on its own actions, nevertheless to explain human feelings through its own first causes and at the same time to have studied to show the way in which the mind is able to have absolute power over the affect but my own sentiment is that he showed nothing other than his own ingenuity as I will demonstrate in its place. For I wish to return to those who prefer to hate or ridicule the actions and affects of humans rather than understand them. To these without a doubt it will seem amazing because I will move forward to explain the sins and errors of humans in a geometric method and I wish to show in a clear method things which repulse reason which they claim to be vain, absurd and horrible. But this is my rationale. Nothing happens in nature which one might attribute to some error of nature itself. For nature is always the same and where it is the same and one in its power and potential for action, that is, the laws of nature and the rules following which everything makes happen and changes from one form into others, are everywhere and always the same and to such a degree one and always the same and also ought to be the reason of things and for understanding nature of qualities, indeed through the laws and universal rules of nature. The affects, in this way, of hatred, envy etc. considered in themselves follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other singularities and next they are ignorant of certain causes by which they understand and certain properties have by our thought equally worthy and properties of whatsoever other thing whose by only our contemplation we are delighted. Thus, concerning the nature and strengths of feelings and the power of the mind over them I will lead in the same way which I led concerning God and the mind and I will consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P49

In mente nulla datur volitio sive affirmatio et negatio præter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit.

In the mind, there exists no will, or better yet an affirmation and negation, which an idea involves except insofar as it is an idea.

In this proposition, Spinoza is building on the fundamental assertion that within the attribute of thinking there is nothing except ideas. There does not exist an independent agency for choice which is not in the form of ideation connection or, better yet, which is outside the chain of cause and effect ideationally.

DEMONSTRATIO: In mente (per propositionem præcedentem) nulla datur absoluta facultas volendi et nolendi sed tantum singulares volitiones nempe hæc et illa affirmatio et hæc et illa negatio. Concipiamus itaque singularem aliquam volitionem nempe modum cogitandi quo mens affirmat tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis. Hæc affirmatio conceptum sive ideam trianguli involvit hoc est sine idea trianguli non potest concipi. Idem enim est si dicam quod A conceptum B debeat involvere ac quod A sine B non possit concipi. Deinde hæc affirmatio (per axioma 3 hujus) non potest etiam sine idea trianguli esse. Hæc ergo affirmatio sine idea trianguli nec esse nec concipi potest. Porro hæc trianguli idea hanc eandem affirmationem involvere debet nempe quod tres ejus anguli æquentur duobus rectis. Quare et vice versa hæc trianguli idea sine hac affirmatione nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque (per definitionem 2 hujus) hæc affirmatio ad essentiam ideæ trianguli pertinet nec aliud præter ipsam est. Et quod de hac volitione diximus (quandoquidem eam ad libitum sumpsimus) dicendum etiam est de quacunque volitione nempe quod præter ideam nihil sit. Q.E.D.

In the mind (by IIP48) no absolute faculty for willing and not willing exists but only singular volitions indeed this and that affirmation and this and that negation. Thus we conceive each singular volition certainly as a mode of thinking in which the mind affirms three angles of a triangle equal two of a rectangle. This affirmation involves the concept or idea of a triangle, that is without the idea of a triangle it is not able to be conceived. For it is the same if I say which A must involve the concept B and where A cannot be conceived without B. Then this affirmation (by IIA3) is not even to be without the idea of a triangle. Therefore this affirmation cannot be nor be conceived without the idea of a triangle. Further, this idea of a triangle ought to involve this same affirmation indeed where three angles of it are equal to two of a rectangle. For what reason and vice versa, this idea of a triangle is unable to be and be conceived without this affirmation (by IID2) to such an extent that this affirmation pertains to the essence of the idea of a triangle and is not anything except itself. And what we have said about this volition (since we assumed this to this as desired) is also saying concerning which volition is indeed nothing except the idea.

In this demonstration, Spinoza confirms the lack of a faculty of willing and clarifies the nature of the affirmation and negation. These "volitions" are simply ideas that work versus ones that don't work. An affirmation follows from an idea that can be conceived or in my parlance that "works." Any such "volitions" are simply modes within the attribute of thinking or ideas. They do not differ from other ideas except that the experience of an affirmation or a negation feels like an engagement in which we are doing something or willing something.

COROLLARIUM: Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.

The will and the intellect are one and the same.

The delineation between the will and the intellect might seem mundane but it appears important as the will seems an active function as opposed to the intellect seeming a passive function. The passivity seems to set up a step removal from the delusion operation of a faculty that generates "self-serving biases." (my term, not Spinoza's)

DEMONSTRATIO: Voluntas et intellectus nihil præter ipsas singulares volitiones et ideas sunt (per propositionem 48 hujus et ejusdem scholium). At singularis volitio et idea (per propositionem præcedentem) unum et idem sunt, ergo voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt. Q.E.D.

The will and the intellect are nothing other than singular volitions and ideas themselves (by IIP48 and IIP48S). But a singular volition and idea (by IIP48) are one and the same, thus will and intellect are one and the same.  

Clearly with in the attribute of thinking, it's all ideas all the time. The ideas themselves have power - particularly in causality.

SCHOLIUM: His causam quæ communiter erroris esse statuitur, sustulimus. Supra autem ostendimus falsitatem in sola privatione quam ideæ mutilatæ et confusæ involvunt, consistere. Quare idea falsa quatenus falsa est, certitudinem non involvit. Cum itaque dicimus hominem in falsis acquiescere nec de iis dubitare, non ideo ipsum certum esse sed tantum non dubitare dicimus vel quod in falsis acquiescit quia nullæ causæ dantur quæ efficiant ut ipsius imaginatio fluctuetur. Qua de re vide scholium propositionis 44 hujus partis. Quantumvis igitur homo falsis adhærere supponatur, nunquam tamen ipsum certum esse dicemus. Nam per certitudinem quid positivum intelligimus (vide propositionem 43 hujus cum ejusdem scholio) non vero dubitationis privationem. At per certitudinis privationem falsitatem intelligimus. Sed ad uberiorem explicationem præcedentis propositionis quædam monenda supersunt. Superest deinde ut ad objectiones quæ in nostram hanc doctrinam objici possunt, respondeam et denique ut omnem amoveam scrupulum, operæ pretium esse duxi hujus doctrinæ quasdam utilitates indicare. Quasdam inquam nam præcipuæ ex iis quæ in quinta parte dicemus, melius intelligentur.

By these, we submit that which which is commonly established as the cause of error. Moreover, beyond that we have shown it to consist in the falsity in only privation which mutilated and confused ideas involve. Thus, a false idea insofar as it is false, involves no certainty. Thus when we say a human falls into false ideas and does not doubt about them, not at any rate is it certain itself but we say that he or she only does not doubt, or falls in false ideas since no causes were given which they effect as the imagination of the person fluctuates. On this, see IIP44S. Therefore, for as long as a person is supposed to cling to falsehoods, nonetheless let us never say that it is certain itself. For by certainty we mean that which is positive (see IIP43 with IIP43S) not indeed the privation of doubt. But we mean falsity by the privation of certainty. But certain warnings support the further explication of the preceding proposition. Next it supports so that they are able to toss out for objections which are in this doctrine of ours, let me respond and next so that I may remove every scruple, the price of the work is that I have led to point out certain things of this doctrine. For I say certain things, special things are understood better from those which we say in the fifth part.

In order for ideas to have causal power, ideas must be true. True does not mean without doubt but does mean with certainty. True has power and is positive. Without doubt has no power. False ideas do not have power. Even though we believe an idea to be true, it may not actually be true - meaning as it is in God. Many contradictions come to mind. However, ideas are complex mixtures which naturally include mutiliated and confused ideas. In this mixture is an amalgam of ideas that are without doubt and with certainty.

Incipio igitur a primo lectoresque moneo ut accurate distinguant inter ideam sive mentis conceptum et inter imagines rerum quas imaginamur. Deinde necesse est ut distinguant inter ideas et verba quibus res significamus. Nam quia hæc tria, imagines scilicet verba et ideæ, a multis vel plane confunduntur vel non satis accurate vel denique non satis caute distinguuntur, ideo hanc de voluntate doctrinam scitu prorsus necessariam tam ad speculationem quam ad vitam sapienter instituendam plane ignorarunt. Quippe qui putant ideas consistere in imaginibus quæ in nobis ex corporum occursu formantur, sibi persuadent ideas illas rerum quarum similem nullam imaginem formare possumus, non esse ideas sed tantum figmenta quæ ex libero voluntatis arbitrio fingimus; ideas igitur veluti picturas in tabula mutas aspiciunt et hoc præjudicio præoccupati non vident ideam quatenus idea est, affirmationem aut negationem involvere. Deinde qui verba confundunt cum idea vel cum ipsa affirmatione quam idea involvit, putant se posse contra id quod sentiunt velle quando aliquid solis verbis contra id quod sentiunt affirmant aut negant. Hæc autem præjudicia exuere facile is poterit qui ad naturam cogitationis attendit, quæ extensionis conceptum minime involvit atque adeo clare intelliget ideam (quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicujus imagine neque in verbis consistere. Verborum namque et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt. Atque hæc pauca de his monuisse sufficiat, quare ad prædictas objectiones transeo. 

Thus I begin from the first and I warned readers that they distinguish accurately between ideas or better yet concepts of the mind and images of things which we imagine. Next it is necessary that they distinguish between ideas and words by which we signify things. For since these three, images as words and ideas, by many either they are confused plainly or not accurately enough or finally they are not distinguished carefully enough, thus by understanding this doctrine about the will, they are clearly ignorant not only for necessary observation but also for instituting life wisely. After all, those who think that ideas consist of images which are formed in us by the impact of bodies, persuade themselves that these ideas of things whose image we are able to form no likeness, are not ideas but such figments which we paint from the free work of the will; thus ideas just as they view mute pictures on tablets and occupied by this prejudice they do not see an idea, insofar as it is an idea, that involves an affirmation or negation. Finally those who confuse words with idea or with the affirmation itself which the idea involves, think that they can against that which they feel to wish somewhere something by only words again it which they feel they affirm or deny. Moreover, from this prejudice one might be able to easily cast off who attends to the nature of thought, which minimally involves the concept of extension and to such a degree understands clearly the idea (since it is a mode of thinking) and to not consist in the image of some thing or in words. For the essence of words and images are constituted by only bodily motions, which involve barely the concept of thought. And let these few suffice to have warned concerning these, thus I transition to likely objections.

Distinguishing ideas from our traditional notion of ideas is one of the most difficult aspects of Book II. Spinoza has identified ideas as modes of thinking within the attribute of thinking. He has already included our sense of feeling as ideas - a contrary notion. Now, he begins to delineate and exclude notions that we have typically included as ideas, such as words and images. In Spinoza's framework, ideas have causal and expressive power in contrast to our typical notion of an idea as disembodied and passive.

Harum prima est quod constare putant voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum atque adeo ab eodem diversam esse. Ratio autem cur putant voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum est quia se experiri aiunt se non majore assentiendi sive affirmandi et negandi facultate indigere ad infinitis aliis rebus quas non percipimus, assentiendum quam jam habemus, at quidem majore facultate intelligendi. Distinguitur ergo voluntas ab intellectu quod finitus hic sit, illa autem infinita.

The first of these is which to establish is that they think will extends itself more widely than the intellect and to such a degree is different from the same. Moreover the reason why they think that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect is because they say that they experience themselves not to need by faculty of greater assenting whether affirming or denying for infinite other things which they do not perceive, assenting which we already have, but indeed for understanding by a greater faculty. Thus the will is distinguished from the intellect which this latter might be finite, while the former is infinite. 

Here Spinoza is attempting to explain the cognition error leading to the imagination that a faculty of the will exists as different from the intellect. By experiencing affirmation or negation of a concept, an individual views that this experience is broader than a full understanding of said concept - thus, leading to a sense of the greater expansiveness and unboundedness of the affirmation or negation. The accumulation of affirmations or negation deludes the individual into a separate, unbounded faculty.

Secundo nobis objici potest quod experientia nihil clarius videatur docere quam quod nostrum judicium possumus suspendere ne rebus quas percipimus, assentiamur; quod hinc etiam confirmatur quod nemo dicitur decipi quatenus aliquid percipit sed tantum quatenus assentitur aut dissentitur. Exempli gratia qui equum alatum fingit, non ideo concedit dari equum alatum hoc est non ideo decipitur nisi simul concedat dari equum alatum; nihil igitur clarius videtur docere experientia quam quod voluntas sive facultas assentiendi libera sit et a facultate intelligendi diversa.

One is able to object to us with the second which nothing seems more clear to show by experience than what we are able to suspend judgment lest in things which we perceive, we assent to; which here is also confirmed that no one is said to be deceived insofar as he or she perceives something but so much as it is assented to or denied. For example, one who paints a flying horse, does not concede to such an extent that a flying horse exists, that is not to the degree that he or she is deceived unless at the same time one concedes that a flying horse exists; thus nothing seems more clear that teaches by experience than will or better yet the faculty of assent is a free and different from the faculty of understanding.

The second error of cognition that Spinoza attempt to explain is the apparent ability to suspend judgment. The ability that we seem to have to assent to or believe in something which defies understanding or reason is the basis of fictional literature or movies and even may be involved with some of the impact of religion or placebo drugs. Spinoza does not attempt to refute this cognitive error but only points out its clear existence.

Tertio objici potest quod una affirmatio non plus realitatis videtur continere quam alia hoc est non majore potentia indigere videmur ad affirmandum verum esse id quod verum est, quam ad aliquid quod falsum est, verum esse affirmandum; at unam ideam plus realitatis sive perfectionis quam aliam habere percipimus; quantum enim objecta alia aliis præstantiora tantum etiam eorum ideæ aliæ aliis perfectiores sunt; ex quibus etiam constare videtur differentia inter voluntatem et intellectum. 

One is able to object with the third which one affirmation does not seem to contain more of reality than others, that is we do not seem to need a greater power for affiming as true that which is true, than for something which is false, affirming as true; but we perceive one idea to have more of reality or perfection than another; for how many objects are more present than others so great even of their ideas are more perfect than others; from which it seems also to establish a difference between the will and intellect.

For the third source of cognitive error which creates a difference between the intellect and the will, Spinoza discusses the apparent difference between an affirmation of truth and false versus a perception of true and false. In the case of affirmations of true and false, no difference in function seems to appear between the two. However, in the case of perceptions, it appears that some ideas have more perfection than others (such as true versus false) and, thus, create a deeper engagement. If this distinction exists, one might object to calling the will and the intellect the same.

Quarto objici potest si homo non operatur ex libertate voluntatis, quid ergo fiet si in æquilibrio sit ut Buridani asina? Famene et siti peribit? Quod si concedam, viderer asinam vel hominis statuam, non hominem concipere; si autem negem, ergo seipsum determinabit et consequenter eundi facultatem et faciendi quicquid velit, habet. Præter hæc alia forsan possunt objici sed quia inculcare non teneor quid unusquisque somniare potest, ad has objectiones tantum respondere curabo idque quam potero breviter.  

One is able to object with the fourth if a human is not operated by freedom of the will, what then might happen if that person might be in equilibrium like the ass of Buridan? Will he or she starve or perish in place? Which if I concede, I seem to conceive an ass or the statue of a human, not a human; moreover if I deny, one then determines oneself and thus has the faculty of going and wishes something of doing. Except these, perhaps others are able to object but because I am not held to inculcate what someone is able to dream, to these objections I will try to respond as much as I am able briefly.

For the fourth objection, Spinoza articulates the argument around Buridan's ass in which a choice is so equal as to be paralyzing. If Spinoza concedes that such equilibrium could arise, then the breaking of such equilibrium indicates the presence of a faculty of will as the ultimate chooser.

Et quidem ad primam dico me concedere voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum si per intellectum claras tantummodo et distinctas ideas intelligant sed nego voluntatem latius se extendere quam perceptiones sive concipiendi facultatem nec sane video cur facultas volendi potius dicenda est infinita quam sentiendi facultas; sicut enim infinita (unum tamen post aliud nam infinita simul affirmare non possumus) eadem volendi facultate possumus affirmare, sic etiam infinita corpora (unum nempe post aliud) eadem sentiendi facultate possumus sentire sive percipere. Quod si dicant infinita dari quæ percipere non possumus? regero nos ea ipsa nulla cogitatione et consequenter nulla volendi facultate posse assequi. At dicunt si Deus vellet efficere ut ea etiam perciperemus, majorem quidem facultatem percipiendi deberet nobis dare sed non majorem quam dedit volendi facultatem; quod idem est ac si dicerent quod si Deus velit efficere ut infinita alia entia intelligeremus, necesse quidem esset ut nobis daret majorem intellectum sed non universaliorem entis ideam quam dedit ad eadem infinita entia amplectendum. Ostendimus enim voluntatem ens esse universale sive ideam qua omnes singulares volitiones hoc est id quod iis omnibus commune est, explicamus. Cum itaque hanc omnium volitionum communem sive universalem ideam facultatem esse credant, minime mirum si hanc facultatem ultra limites intellectus in infinitum se extendere dicant. Universale enim æque de uno ac de pluribus ac de infinitis individuis dicitur.

Indeed for the first I say that I concede that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect if by intellect they understand to this extent clear and distinct ideas but I deny that the will extends itself more widely than perceptions or better as a faculty of desiring and I do not see well why the faculty for willing rather is said to be infinite rather than the faculty for feeling; for just as infinite things (nevertheless one after another for we are not able to affirm at the same time as infinite) we are able to affirm the same things by the faculty for willing, thus also infinite bodies (certainly one after another) we are able to feel or perceive with the faculty of feeling. What is they say that infinite things exist which we are not able to perceive? I reply that we can follow no things with cogitation and consequently with no faculty of willing. But they say if God wishes to effect that we might also perceive these, indeed it ought to exist for us the greater faculty for perceiving but not greater indeed than God gives the faculty for willing; because the same is as if they say what if God wishes to effect that we might understand infinite other beings, indeed it might be necessary that to us God might give the greater intellect but not the idea of a more universal being than God gives to embracing infinite other beings. For we show that the will is a universal entity or better an idea by which we explain all singular volitions, that is it is what is common to all things. Since in this way they believe that this faculty is this common or universal idea of all of the volitions, it's not suprising if they say that this faculty extends beyond the limits of the intellect into infinity itself. For it is said universally equally from one and from many and from infinite individuals.

For the first objection, Spinoza agrees that the so-called faculty for willing is greater than the intellect if the comparison is between the affirmation of an idea and the conceptualization of a clear and distinct idea. However, he states that this comparison is faulty. Instead the faculty for willing should be compared to the faculty for feeling. One of Spinoza's surprising arguments in Part II is that the area of feeling is of ideas and of the mind. Our traditional distinction is between thoughts and feelings. He again says that feelings are a form of ideation.

Ad secundam objectionem respondeo negando nos liberam habere potestatem judicium suspendendi. Nam cum dicimus aliquem judicium suspendere, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod videt se rem non adæquate percipere. Est igitur judicii suspensio revera perceptio et non libera voluntas. Quod ut clare intelligatur, concipiamus puerum equum alatum imaginantem nec aliud quicquam percipientem. Quandoquidem hæc imaginatio equi existentiam involvit (per corollarium propositionis 17 hujus) nec puer quicquam percipit quod equi existentiam tollat, ille necessario equum ut præsentem contemplabitur nec de ejus existentia poterit dubitare quamvis de eadem non sit certus. Atque hoc quotidie in somnis experimur nec credo aliquem esse qui putet se, dum somniat, liberam habere potestatem suspendendi de iis quæ somniat, judicium efficiendique ut ea quæ se videre somniat, non somniet et nihilominus contingit ut etiam in somnis judicium suspendamus nempe cum somniamus nos somniare. Porro concedo neminem decipi quatenus percipit hoc est mentis imaginationes in se consideratas nihil erroris involvere concedo (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus) sed nego hominem nihil affirmare quatenus percipit. Nam quid aliud est equum alatum percipere quam alas de equo affirmare? Si enim mens præter equum alatum nihil aliud perciperet, eundem sibi præsentem contemplaretur nec causam haberet ullam dubitandi de ejusdem existentia nec ullam dissentiendi facultatem nisi imaginatio equi alati juncta sit ideæ quæ existentiam ejusdem equi tollit vel quod percipit ideam equi alati quam habet esse inadæquatam atque tum vel ejusdem equi existentiam necessario negabit vel de eadem necessario dubitabit. 

To the next objection, I respond that denying that we have free power for suspending judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we say nothing other than that we do not adequately perceive what seems to be the thing. Thus a suspension of judgment is a changing perception and not free will. Which as it is clearly understood, we conceive a youth imagining a winged horse and not perceiving something else. Since this imagination involves the existence of the horse (by IIP17C) and the boy does not perceive anything which gives rise to the existence of the horse, he necessarily contemplates the horse as present and is not able to doubt the existence of the horse although he is not certain about the same. And this daily in dreams we experience and I do not believe anyone is who he thinks himself, while he dreams, to have the free power for suspending judgment about these which he dreams, and effecting as he dreams things which he sees, that he does not dream and no less happens that also we might suspend judgment in dreams, namely, when we dream that we dream. Next I concede that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives that is the imaginations of the mind considered in itself I concede involves nothing of error (see IIP17S) but I deny that a human affirms nothing insofar as he perceives. For what is something to perceive a winged horse than to affirm wings about the horse? For if the mind perceives nothing except the winged horse, the same presenting to itself is contemplated and does not have any other cause for doubting concerning the existence of the same and not a faculty for dissenting unless the imagination of the winged horse is joined to the idea which lifts away the existence of the same horse or which perceives the idea of the winged horse which has to be inadequate and then either then he will deny necessarily the existence of the same horse or doubt about the same necessarily.

For the second objection, Spinoza addresses the area of suspending judgment. His argument denies that such a thing exist. He does not directly address the sensation of reading a fictional book and getting caught up in the story. However, his example of dreaming does connect with the sensation that our minds at times do immerse themselves in things which are clearly unreal. His argument is that while such things occur, we lack the freedom to determine when and how they occur - thus, we lack "free power." Thus, one might after waking from a dream or on finishing a book find that reality reappears and the unreality of dreams or fictions disappear.

Atque his puto me ad tertiam etiam objectionem respondisse nempe quod voluntas universale quid sit quod de omnibus ideis prædicatur quodque id tantum significat quod omnibus ideis commune est nempe affirmationem. Cujus propterea adæquata essentia quatenus sic abstracte concipitur, debet esse in unaquaque idea et hac ratione tantum in omnibus eadem sed non quatenus consideratur essentiam ideæ constituere nam eatenus singulares affirmationes æque inter se differunt ac ipsæ ideæ. Exempli gratia affirmatio quam idea circuli ab illa quam idea trianguli involvit æque differt ac idea circuli ab idea trianguli. Deinde absolute nego nos æquali cogitandi potentia indigere ad affirmandum verum esse id quod verum est quam ad affirmandum verum esse id quod falsum est. Nam hæ duæ affirmationes, si mentem spectes, se habent ad invicem ut ens ad non-ens; nihil enim in ideis positivum est quod falsitatis formam constituit (vide propositionem 35 hujus cum ejus scholio et scholium propositionis 47 hujus). Quare hic apprime venit notandum quam facile decipimur quando universalia cum singularibus, et entia rationis et abstracta cum realibus confundimus. 

And with these I think that I have responded also to the third objection, namely that there might be some universal will which about all ideas is predicated each signifies it so much which is common to all ideas, namely an affirmation. Meanwhile whose adequate essence insofar as it is conceived so abstractly, ought to be in each and every idea and by this reason so much the same in all but not insofar as it is considered to constitute the essence of the idea for whatever singular affirmations differ equally amoung themselves as the ideas themselves. For example, the affirmation which the idea of the circle involves from that which idea of the triangle differs equally as the idea of the triangle from the idea of the triangle. Next I absolutely deny that we lack the power of equally thinking for affirming that it is true which is true than for affirming that it is true what is false. For these two affirmations, if you observe the mind, have themselves for alternating as being to non-being; for nothing is positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity (see IIP35 and IIP35C and IIP47S). On which account this especially comes noting that we are easily deceived since universals with singular things and confuse the being and abstraction of reason with real things. 

Spinoza deals with the third objection by arguing that abstraction does not create the abstraction simply by the action of finding commonalities. Thus, just because an affirmation relates to a specific idea does not mean that affirmations are a thing which is separate from the idea and thus allow for a faculty of affirmation. Instead, Spinoza views the greater truth or perfection in the singularity of which an affirmation or negation is simply a part or aspect of the singularity. The cognitive error of abstractions becoming more real or more perfect things is common.

Quod denique ad quartam objectionem attinet, dico me omnino concedere quod homo in tali æquilibrio positus (nempe qui nihil aliud percipit quam sitim et famem, talem cibum et talem potum qui æque ab eo distant) fame et siti peribit. Si me rogant an talis homo non potius asinus quam homo sit æstimandus? dico me nescire ut etiam nescio quanti æstimandus sit ille qui se pensilem facit et quanti æstimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani, etc. 

Next that attains the fourth objection, I say that I concede altogether what a human placed in such equilibrium (certainly who perceives nothing else than thirst and hunger, such food and such water which are equally from the person) perishes by hunger and thirst.  If they ask me might such a human might not be estimated rather as an ass rather than as a human? I say that I do not know as I also do not know how much might be estimated who makes a pendent of himself or children, or idiots or insane ones etc.

Spinoza shows little patience for theoretical arguments that do not bear resemblance to reality as he simple dismisses the Buridan's ass argument as a form of insanity if there were discoverable real-life examples.

Superest tandem indicare quantum hujus doctrinæ cognitio ad usum vitæ conferat, quod facile ex his animadvertemus. Nempe 

Finally, it remains to indicate how much the understanding of this doctrine confers on the use of life, which easily from these we turn towards. Namely,

I° quatenus docet nos ex solo Dei nutu agere divinæque naturæ esse participes et eo magis quo perfectiores actiones agimus et quo magis magisque Deum intelligimus. Hæc ergo doctrina præterquam quod animum omnimode quietum reddit, hoc etiam habet quod nos docet in quo nostra summa felicitas sive beatitudo consistit nempe in sola Dei cognitione ex qua ad ea tantum agenda inducimur quæ amor et pietas suadent. Unde clare intelligimus quantum illi a vera virtutis æstimatione aberrant qui pro virtute et optimis actionibus tanquam pro summa servitute, summis præmiis a Deo decorari exspectant quasi ipsa virtus Deique servitus non esset ipsa felicitas et summa libertas. 

1. insofar as it leads us to do from the will alone of God and to be participants of divine nature and by this more so much more perfect actions we do and so much more and more we understand God. Thus, this doctrine that returns quiet spirit of every sort, also has by this which leads us in which our highest happiness or blessedness consists, namely in solely the understanding of God from which we are led to such greater things which love and piety urge. From where we understand clearly how much those wander away from true estimate of virtue who on behalf of virtue and best actions so to speak on behalf of the highest service, expect to be decorated with the highest rewards from God as if virtue itself and the service of God is not happiness itself and the highest liberty.

While Spinoza is not teleological and no fan of "where should we go?" reasoning, here he outlines the fullness of our expressed singularity - we are more perfect insofar as our actions express the will of God and we are more quiet, happier and more blessed insofar as we are aware of this participation in divine nature. This virtue in the service of God is happiness itself and generates the highest freedom.

II° Quatenus docet quomodo circa res fortunæ sive quæ in nostra potestate non sunt hoc est circa res quæ ex nostra natura non sequuntur, nos gerere debeamus nempe utramque fortunæ faciem æquo animo exspectare et ferre : nimirum quia omnia ab æterno Dei decreto eadem necessitate sequuntur ac ex essentia trianguli sequitur quod tres ejus anguli sunt æquales duobus rectis. 

2. Insofar as it leads to where around things of fortune or which are not in our power, that is around things which do not follow from our own nature, we ought to carry that we namely to expect and carry the other face of fortune with calm spirit; too much because all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity that follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles equal to two angles of a rectangle.

Here Spinoza focuses on the things we cannot control. Since these things follow from "the eternal decree of God" or are as they must be, Spinoza argues that we embrace these things with a calm spirit.

III° Confert hæc doctrina ad vitam socialem quatenus docet neminem odio habere, contemnere, irridere, nemini irasci, invidere. Præterea quatenus docet ut unusquisque suis sit contentus et proximo auxilio, non ex muliebri misericordia, partialitate neque superstitione sed ex solo rationis ductu prout scilicet tempus et res postulat ut in quarta parte ostendam. 

3. This doctrine confers to social life insofar as it leads no one to have hate, to condemn, explode, to be angry at no one, to hate no one. Besides, insofar as it leads as each and every one might be content with themselves and with nearby aid, not from feminine compassion, nor partiality and not from superstition but led from reason alone just as of course time and thing postulate as I show in the fourth part.

Here Spinoza indicates the increase of power by a clear thought process. This reasoning becomes its own source of contentment, as opposed to acting like an immature person with hatred, angry fits or in need of hugs, biases or myth.

IV° Denique confert etiam hæc doctrina non parum ad communem societatem quatenus docet qua ratione cives gubernandi sint et ducendi nempe non ut serviant sed ut libere ea quæ optima sunt, agant. Atque his quæ in hoc scholio agere constitueram, absolvi et eo finem huic nostræ secundæ parti impono in qua puto me naturam mentis humanæ ejusque proprietates satis prolixe et quantum rei difficultas fert, clare explicuisse atque talia tradidisse ex quibus multa præclara, maxime utilia et cognitu necessaria concludi possunt, ut partim ex sequentibus constabit. 

4. Finally this doctrine also confers not a little to common society insofar as it leads by which reason citizens ought to govern and lead, namely not as they serve but to act to free things which are best. And by these which in this scholium I have established to do, I have freed and from this I place the end of this second part in which I think that I have explained clearly the nature of the human mind and its properties clearly enough and how mich difficulty of thing there is and have surrendered such things from which many clear things, maximally useful and with thought necessary things are able to be concluded, so that it partly will establish from the following.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P47

Mens humana adæquatam habet cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei.

The human mind has an adequate understanding of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens humana ideas habet (per propositionem 22 hujus) ex quibus (per propositionem 23 hujus) se suumque corpus (per propositionem 19 hujus) et (per corollarium I propositionis 16 et per propositionem 17 hujus) corpora externa ut actu existentia percipit adeoque (per propositiones 45 et 46 hujus) cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei habet adæquatam. Q.E.D.

The human mind has ideas (by IIP22) out of which (by IIP23) it perceives itself and its body (by IIP19) and (by IP16C and IIP17) external bodies as actually existing to such an extent (by IIP45 and 46) it has an adequate understanding of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc videmus Dei infinitam essentiam ejusque æternitatem omnibus esse notam. Cum autem omnia in Deo sint et per Deum concipiantur, sequitur nos ex cognitione hac plurima posse deducere quæ adæquate cognoscamus atque adeo tertium illud cognitionis genus formare de quo diximus in scholio II propositionis 40 hujus partis et de cujus præstantia et utilitate in quinta parte erit nobis dicendi locus. Quod autem homines non æque claram Dei ac notionum communium habeant cognitionem, inde fit quod Deum imaginari nequeant ut corpora et quod nomen "Deus" junxerunt imaginibus rerum quas videre solent; quod homines vix vitare possunt quia continuo a corporibus externis afficiuntur. Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt quod scilicet nomina rebus non recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait lineas quæ ex centro circuli ad ejusdem circumferentiam ducuntur esse inæquales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit quam mathematici. Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in charta habent. Quare si ipsorum mentem spectes, non errant sane; videntur tamen errare quia ipsos in mente putamus habere numeros qui in charta sunt. Si hoc non esset, nihil eosdem errare crederemus; ut non credidi quendam errare quem nuper audivi clamantem suum atrium volasse in gallinam vicini quia scilicet ipsius mens satis perspecta mihi videbatur. Atque hinc pleræque oriuntur controversiæ nempe quia homines mentem suam non recte explicant vel quia alterius mentem male interpretantur. Nam revera dum sibi maxime contradicunt, vel eadem vel diversa cogitant ita ut quos in alio errores et absurda esse putant, non sint.

From here we see that the infinite essence of God and its eternity is known by everything. Since moreover everything is in God and conceived through God, it follows that we from this understanding are able to deduce more things which we know adequately and to such an extent form that third kind of knowledge about which we said in II40S2 and about its excellence and utility in the fifth part will be a place for us to discuss. Moreover, because people do not equally have a clear understanding of God and common notions, from there it happens that they deny that God is imagined as bodies and what name God they have joined by images of things which they are accustomed to see; because people are scarcely able to avoid since they are continually affected by external bodies. And assuredly they maintain the majority of errors in this alone because obviously we do not apply names to things correctly. For when someone says lines which lead from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, that person understands something then through the circle than mathematics. Thus, when people err in calculation, they have other numbers in mind, others on paper. Thus, if you look at the mind of them, they do not err clearly; nevertheless they seem to err because we think they have the numbers themselves in mind which are on the paper. If this is not so, we might believe nothing that the same err; so that I did not believe whomever erred that recently I heard shouting that his courtyard had flown into his neighbor's hen because of course the thought of it seemed clear enough to me. And from here many more controversies have arisen certainly because people do not explain their mind clearly or because one mind interpret another poorly. For actually as long as they contradict themselves greatly or think the same thing or different things so much that they think those who err in another are absurd, are not.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P48

In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum.

In the mind no will is absolute or free but the mind is determined to willing this or that by a cause which also has been determined by something else and again this from another and thus into infinity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (per propositionem 11 hujus) adeoque (per corollarium II propositionis 17 partis I) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera sive absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (per propositionem 28 partis I) determinari debet a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia etc. Q.E.D.

The mind is a certain and determined mode for knowing (by IIP11) to such a degree (by IP17IIC) is not able to be a free cause of its own actions or is not able to have an absolute faculty for willing or not willing but for willing this or that (by IP28) it ought to be determined from a cause which has also been determined from another and this again from another etc.

SCHOLIUM: Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc. Unde sequitur has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias vel nihil esse præter entia metaphysica vel universalia quæ ex particularibus formare solemus. Adeo ut intellectus et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem cur homines se liberos esse putent explicuimus in appendice partis primæ. Verum antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem inquam intelligo qua mens quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat et non cupiditatem qua mens res appetit vel aversatur. At postquam demonstravimus has facultates notiones esse universales quæ a singularibus ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum jam est an ipsæ volitiones aliquid sint præter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum inquam est an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur præter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide sequentem propositionem ut et demonstrationem 3 hujus ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines quales in fundo oculi et si placet, in medio cerebro formantur sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.

In this same way it is demonstrated in the mind there is no absolute faculty for understanding, desiring, loving etc. From which it follows that these and similar faculties are actually fictions are either nothing but metaphysical or universal entities which we are are accustomed to form from particulars. To such a degree the intellect and will hold themselves in the same way to this and that idea or to this and that volition and as stoneness is to this and that stone or as humanness is to Peter and Paul. Moreover we have explained the cause why humans think themselves to be free in the appendix of the first part. Indeed before I travel further, let it be noted here that by will I understand the faculty of affirming and denying, not desiring moreover; I say that I understand the faculty by which the mind has that is true or what is false, affirms or denies and not the desire by what thing the mind desires or is repelled. But after we have shown these faculties are universal notions which are not distinct from the singular things from which we form them, we now are inquiring whether the volitions themselves are something beyond the ideas of the things themselves. I say inquiring is either in the mind by some affirmation and negation given except that which is an idea involves insofar as an idea - see following proposition and D3 lest the thinking of this fall into pictures. For I do not understand by ideas such images which in base of the eyes if it pleases, it is formed in the middle of the brain but the concepts of understanding.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P46

Cognitio æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei quam unaquæque idea involvit, est adæquata et perfecta.

The knowledge of eternal and infinite essence of God which each and every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

DEMONSTRATIO: Demonstratio præcedentis propositionis universalis est et sive res ut pars sive ut totum consideretur, ejus idea sive totius sit sive partis (per propositionem præcedentem) Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvet. Quare id quod cognitionem æternæ et infinitæ essentiæ Dei dat, omnibus commune et æque in parte ac in toto est adeoque (per propositionem 38 hujus) erit hæc cognitio adæquata. Q.E.D.

The demonstration of the preceding proposition is universal and whether the thing as part or as the whole is considered, its idea whether totally or partially (by IIP45) involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. Thus, that which gives the knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, by all things is commonly and equally in part and in the whole is to such a degree (by IIP38) will be this adequate knowledge.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P45

Unaquæque cujuscunque corporis vel rei singularis actu existentis idea Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit.

Each and every idea of whatsoever body or singular thing by means of the act of existence involves the eternal and infinite essence of God by necessity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Idea rei singularis actu existentis ipsius rei tam essentiam quam existentiam necessario involvit (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus). At res singulares (per propositionem 15 partis I) non possunt sine Deo concipi sed quia (per propositionem 6 hujus) Deum pro causa habent quatenus sub attributo consideratur cujus res ipsæ modi sunt, debent necessario earum ideæ (per axioma 4 partis I) ipsarum attributi conceptum hoc est (per definitionem 6 partis I) Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam involvere. Q.E.D.

The idea of a singular thing involves by necessity by the act of existing of the thing itself involves not only essence but existence as well.

SCHOLIUM: Hic per existentiam non intelligo durationem hoc est existentiam quatenus abstracte concipitur et tanquam quædam quantitatis species. Nam loquor de ipsa natura existentiæ quæ rebus singularibus tribuitur propterea quod ex æterna necessitate Dei naturæ infinita infinitis modis sequuntur (vide propositionem 16 partis I). Loquor inquam de ipsa existentia rerum singularium quatenus in Deo sunt. Nam etsi unaquæque ab alia re singulari determinetur ad certo modo existendum, vis tamen qua unaquæque in existendo perseverat, ex æterna necessitate naturæ Dei sequitur. Qua de re vide corollarium propositionis 24 partis I.

Here by existence I do not understand duration, that is existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly and so to speak, a certain kind of quantity. For I speak about the nature itself of existence which is divided by singular things thus that which follow from the eternal necessity of God by infinite nature in infinite modes (see IP16). I speak, I say concerning the existence itself of singular things insofar as they are in God. For as if each and every thing is determined by some singular thing for existing by a certain mode, nevertheless the power by which each and every thing perseveres in existence, it follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. Concerning which see IP24C.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P44

De natura rationis non est res ut contingentes sed ut necessarias contemplari.

Concerning the nature of reason it is not that it observes things as contingent but as necessary.

DEMONSTRATIO: De natura rationis est res vere percipere (per propositionem 41 hujus) nempe (per axioma 6 partis I) ut in se sunt hoc est (per propositionem 29 partis I) non ut contingentes sed ut necessarias. Q.E.D.

Demonstration: Concerning the nature of reason it is that it truly perceives things (by IIP41), namely (by IA6) that they are in themselves, that is (by IP29) not as contingent buy as necessary.

COROLLARIUM I: Hinc sequitur a sola imaginatione pendere quod res tam respectu præteriti quam futuri ut contingentes contemplemur.

Corollary 1: From this it follows that it depends on the imagination alone that we observe things as contingent not only with respect to the past but also to the future.

SCHOLIUM: Qua autem ratione hoc fiat paucis explicabo. Ostendimus supra (propositione 17 hujus cum ejus corollario) mentem, quamvis res non existant, eas tamen semper ut sibi præsentes imaginari nisi causæ occurrant quæ earum præsentem existentiam secludant. Deinde (propositione 18 hujus) ostendimus quod si corpus humanum semel a duobus corporibus externis simul affectum fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur hoc est ambo ut sibi præsentia contemplabitur nisi causæ occurrant quæ eorum præsentem existentiam secludant. Præterea nemo dubitat quin etiam tempus imaginemur nempe ex eo quod corpora alia aliis tardius vel celerius vel æque celeriter moveri imaginemur. Ponamus itaque puerum qui heri prima vice hora matutina viderit Petrum, meridiana autem Paulum et vespertina Simeonem atque hodie iterum matutina hora Petrum. Ex propositione 18 hujus patet quod simulac matutinam lucem videt, illico solem eandem cæli quam die præcedenti viderit partem percurrentem sive diem integrum et simul cum tempore matutino Petrum, cum meridiano autem Paulum et cum vespertino Simeonem imaginabitur hoc est Pauli et Simeonis existentiam cum relatione ad futurum tempus imaginabitur et contra si hora vespertina Simeonem videat, Paulum et Petrum ad tempus præteritum referet, eosdem scilicet simul cum tempore præterito imaginando atque hæc eo constantius quo sæpius eos eodem hoc ordine viderit. Quod si aliquando contingat ut alia quadam vespera loco Simeonis Jacobum videat, tum sequenti mane cum tempore vespertino jam Simeonem jam Jacobum, non vero ambos simul imaginabitur. Nam alterutrum tantum, non autem ambos simul tempore vespertino vidisse supponitur. Fluctuabitur itaque ejus imaginatio et cum futuro tempore vespertino jam hunc jam illum imaginabitur hoc est neutrum certo sed utrumque contingenter futurum contemplabitur. Atque hæc imaginationis fluctuatio eadem erit si imaginatio rerum sit quas eodem modo cum relatione ad tempus præteritum vel præsens contemplamur et consequenter res tam ad tempus præsens quam ad præteritum vel futurum relatas ut contingentes imaginabimur.

Scholium: Moreover, I will with a few words by what way this happens. We have shown above (IIP7/C) the mind, although things do not exist, nevertheless always imagines things as if present to itself unless causes happen which exclude their present existence. Next (IIP18) we have shown that if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies at the same time, when the mind later imagines one of them, immediately remembers the other, that is observes both as present to itself unless causes occur which preclude their present existence. Meanwhile no one doubts that we do not also imagine time, namely that some bodies move more quickly than others, some more slowly and some equally quickly. Let us suppose that a boy who saw Peter yesterday morning, then Paul in midday and Simon in the evening and then Peter today in the morning. From IIP18, it is clear that as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine the same sun in the spot of the sky which he saw a passing part on the preceding day or even more the whole day and at the same time Peter with the morning, then Paul with midday and Simon with evening, that is he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time and, in contrast, if he might see Simon in the evening, he might refer Paul and Peter to an earlier time, of course by imagining the same ones together with the earlier time and these things the more constantly the more often he will see them in this same order. Because if it happens some other time that he might see on another certain evening Jacob in place of Simon, then on the following morning he will imagine now Simon, now Jacob with the evening time, indeed not both together. For it is supposed that he has seen one of the two not both together at the evening time. Thus his imagination will fluctuate and will imagine now this now that with a future evening time, that is, he will observe neither as certain future but both as contingent. And this fluctuation of imagination will be the same if the imagination of things which we observe in the same way with relation to an earlier or present time and consequently we imagine things relating to a present time or an earlier or future time as contingent.

COROLLARIUM II: De natura rationis est res sub quadam æternitatis specie percipere.

Concerning the nature of reason it is that it perceives things under a certain species of eternity.

DEMONSTRATIO: De natura enim rationis est res ut necessarias et non ut contingentes contemplari (per propositionem præcedentem). Hanc autem rerum necessitatem (per propositionem 41 hujus) vere hoc est (per axioma 6 partis I) ut in se est, percipit. Sed (per propositionem 16 partis I) hæc rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei æternæ naturæ necessitas; ergo de natura rationis est res sub hac æternitatis specie contemplari. Adde quod fundamenta rationis notiones sint (per propositionem 38 hujus) quæ illa explicant quæ omnibus communia sunt quæque (per propositionem 37 hujus) nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant quæque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione sed sub quadam æternitatis specie debent concipi. Q.E.D. 

Concerning the nature of reason it is that it observes things as necessary and not as contingent (by IIP43). Moreover it perceives this necessity of things (by IIP41) truly, that is (by IA6) as in itself. But (IP16) this necessity of things is the necessity itself of God's eternal nature; thus concerning the nature of reason is that is observes things under the this species of eternity. Ad what are the fundament notions of reason (by IIP38) which explicate those things which are common to all and which (by IIP37) do not explicate the essence of any singular thing and besides which ought be conceived without any relation of time but under a certain species of eternity.