Spinoza's Ethics: I.P32: God's Will

Spinoza has led up to this proposition by P31 where he clearly defines will as within the category of Nature natured, rather than Nature naturing. Nature natured lacks free cause which is only within Nature naturing. Spinoza's demonstration follows this line of reasoning established on discussing the intellect. By defining the will as "like the intellect," Spinoza simply applies the reasoning applied earlier to the intellect. Here again Spinoza delivers significant effort to disabuse readers of the notion of "free"will. He grants the faculty of will, but shows that will operates within the natural framework under necessity. His necessity is characterized by certo modo which translates as "in a certain way." I don't think this translation conveys adequately the sense of specificity or singularity of the action. I think Spinoza is meaning that the cause produces the effect "with precision," removing both vagueness and randomness.

Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera sed tantum necessaria.

Translated as,

The will cannot be called a free cause but only a necessary [cause].

Demonstratio: Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est sicuti intellectus adeoque (per propositionem 28) unaquaeque volitio non potest existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia causa determinetur et haec rursus ab alia et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est sed quatenus attributum habet quod infinitam et aeternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per propositionem 23). Quocunque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur adeoque (per definitionem 7) non potest dici causa libera sed tantum necessaria
vel coacta. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The will is only a certain mode of thinking just as is the intellect. To such an extent (by P28) each and every volition can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. Even if the will is held to be infinite, it must still be determined to exist and operate by God, not insofar as substance is an absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as [God] has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by P23). So in whatsoever way [will] is conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and operate. To such an extent (by D7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled [cause].

Corollarium I: Hinc sequitur I Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. 

Translated as,

From this it follows, first, that God does not operate by freedom of the will.

Corollarium II: Sequitur II voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere ut mote et quies et absolute ut omnia naturalia quae (per propositionem 29) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere quam propter ea quae ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur) dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua quae ostendimus ex necessitate divinae naturae sequi et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.

Translated as,

It follows, second, that will and intellect are to God's nature as motion and rest are absolutely all natural things, which (by P29) must be determined by God to exist and operate in a certain way. For the will, like all other things, requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and operate in a certain way. And although from a given will, or intellect infinitely many things may follow, God still cannot be said, on that account, to act from freedom of the will, any more than [God] can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest on account of those things that follow from motion and rest (for infinitely many things also follow from motion and rest). So will does not pertain to God's nature any more than do the other natural things, but is related to it in the same way as motion and rest, and all the other things which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and operate in a certain way.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P31: Intellect in Action

Spinoza distinguishes clearly here between our intellect, which is a mode of the attribute of thought, and the attribute of thought. Our intellect is just one of an array of modes of thought. The attribute of thought which he calls absolute thought is of a completely different order. He then addresses the issue of the intellect insofar as it relates to the activity of understanding. He is careful to not address the potential for thinking, because he is demonstrating how the intellect functions within a framework of modal causality.

Intellectus actu sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad Naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem referri debent. 

Translated as,

The intellect, whether finite or infinite in action, like will, desire, love, etc. ought to be referred to as Nature natured, not as Nature naturing.

Demonstratio: Per intellectum enim (ut per se notum) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modis ab aliis scilicet cupiditate, amore, etc. differt adeoque (per definitionem 5) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet nempe (per propositionem 15 et definitionem 6) per aliquod Dei attributum quod aeternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit ac propterea (per scholium propositionis 29) ad Naturam naturatam, non vero naturantem referri debet ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

By intellect (as is known through itself) we understand not absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from the others, such as desire, love, etc., and to such a degree (by D5) truly ought to be conceived by absolute thought, that is (by P15 and D6), it must be conceived in this way by some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought so that without that attribute it can neither be nor be conceived and so (by P29S) like the other modes of thinking, it must be referred to as Nature natured not as Natura naturing.

Scholium: Ratio cur hic loquar de intellectu actu non est quia concedo ullum dari intellectum potentia sed quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui nisi de re nobis quam clarissime percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus ad perfectiorem intellectionis cogitationem non conducat.

Translated as,

The reason why I speak here of the intellect in action is not because I concede that there is an intellect in potential, but, because I wish to avoid all confusion, I do not wish to speak of things unless we perceive [them] as clearly as possible.  Certainly concerning intellectual activity itself, nothing is more clear to our perception. For we are able to understand nothing that does not lead to more perfect thinking of intellectual activity.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P30: View From Somewhere

Here Spinoza outlines the structure of perceiving or comprehending - activity of the intellect which, as I posted earlier, operates from somewhere. This is in contrast to conceiving which is capable of knowing substance as substance as a view from nowhere. The delineation sets up for conceive/perceive/imagine as a spectrum of activities of the mind.

Intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud.

Translated as,

An intellect, whether finite in action or infinite in action, must comprehend God's attributes and God's modifications and nothing else.

Demonstratio: Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (per axioma 6) hoc est (ut per se notum) id quod in intellectu objective continentur, debet necessario in natura dari. Atqui in natura (per corollarium I propositionis 14) non nisi una substantia datur nempe Deus nec ullae aliae affectiones (per propositionem 15) quam quae in Deo sunt et quae (per eandem propositionem) sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt; ergo intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

A true idea must agree with its object (by A6), that is (as is known through itself), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be given in nature. But in nature (by P14C1) there is only one substance, namely, God, and there are no modifications other than those which are in God (by P15) and which can neither be nor be conceived without God (by the same proposition). Therefore, an intellect, whether finite in action or infinite in action, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P29: Nothing is Contingent

The importance of this Scholium is debated because its connection to the Proposition and Demonstration is indirect, but I think it is important. Spinoza has been tracing the movement from Substance to Modes. Here the connection is tightened as not contingent. This connection resembles the movement in physics from certainty at large scale objects to probable at small scales. This connection is further clarified by the distinction between naturing Nature and natured Nature. When Spinoza describes that aspect of God which is naturing Nature, it is as the attribute expresses essence in an action of free cause as the virtual becomes real. When Spinoza describes that aspect of God which is natured Nature, it is as expressed modally from the attributes as things. Here he describes a process in a language that is biological.

In rerum natura nullum datur contingens sed omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum.

Translated as,

In the nature of things, nothing is contingent, instead all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an outcome in a certain way.

Demonstratio: Quicquid est in Deo est (per propositionem 15): Deus autem non potest dici res contingens. Nam (per propositionem 11) necessario, non vero contingenter existit. Modi deinde divinae naturae ex eadem etiam necessario, non vero contingenter secuti sunt (per propositionem 16) idque vel quatenus divina natura absolute (per propositionem 21) vel quatenus certo modo ad agendum determinata consideratur (per propositionem 27). Porro horum modorum Deus non tantum est causa quatenus simpliciter existunt (per corollarium propositionis 24) sed etiam (per propositionem 26) quatenus ad aliquid operandum determinati considerantur. Quod si a Deo (per eandem propositionem) determinati non sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos determinent et contra (per propositionem 27) si a Deo determinati sint, impossibile, non vero contingens est ut se ipsos indeterminatos reddant. Quare omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum sed etiam certo modo existendum et operandum nullumque datur contingens. Q.E.D. 

Translated as,

Whatever is, is in God (by P15): moreover God cannot be called contingent thing. For (by P11) [God] exists necessarily, truly not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from the same [divine nature] necessarily and truly not contingently (by P16) and [whatever] is is either insofar as by divine nature absolutely (by P21) or insofar as it is considered to be determined to act in a certain way (by P27). Further, God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist (by P24C), but also (by P26) insofar as they are considered to be determined to produce some outcome. For if they have not been determined by God, then (by P26) it is impossible, not in fact contingent, that they should determine themselves. Conversely (by P27) if they have been determined by God, it is impossible, not in fact contingent, that they should render themselves undetermined. So all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but to exist in a certain way, and to produce an outcome in a certain way. So nothing is contingent.

Scholium: Antequam ulterius pergam, hic quid nobis per Naturam naturantem et quid per Naturam naturatem intelligendum sit, explicare volo vel potius monere. Nam ex antecedentibus jam constare existimo nempe quod per Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id quod in se est et per se concipitur sive talia substantiae attributa quae aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimunt hoc est (per corollarium I propositionis 14 et corollarium 17 propositionis 17) Deus quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturae sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur hoc est omnes Dei attributorum modos quatenus considerantur ut res quae in Deo sunt et quae sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt. 

Translated as,

Before I proceed further, I wish to explain here or rather to warn what we must understand by Nature naturing and Nature natured. For from the preceding I estimate as already established that by Nature naturing, we ought to understand as what is in itself and is conceived through itself or such attributes of substance which express an eternal and infinite essence, that is (by P14C1 and P17C2), God, insofar as a free cause is considered. Moreover, by [Nature] natured, I understand everything which follows from the necessity of God's nature, or from whatsoever of God's attributes, that is, all of  God's attributes insofar as they are considered modes as things which are in God and which can neither be nor be conceived without God.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P28: Infinite Singular Causality

Here Spinoza is continuing to build out a discussion of cause and effect which took initial form with I.A3. Spinoza is stating that cause and effect cannot be connected unless they share a common finite and determined existence. The implication is that although the chain of causation for a singular thing is infinite, the cause itself can only be finite. God, as substance, then, is the immanent cause of particular things, but God, as modifications, is the particular cause. 

The demonstration of the proposition emphasizes the concept of immanence - so far from a notion of transcendent God does Spinoza take us that even the concept of an immanent God insofar as God is eternal and infinite is not "causing" our situations. Rather, God insofar as God is a modification which is finite and of limited duration is our "cause." In this way, Spinoza tightens the logic on those who might seek to distort the concept of immanence to fit their historical uses of transcendence.

This note makes a rough distinction between two types of causes: proximate and remote. All of I.P28 is focused on the causality of singular things with an infinite chain of causality. The demonstration emphasizes God as cause, not insofar as God is eternal and infinite, but insofar as God is a modification which is finite and has duration. So too the note makes a similar distinction: God is always the cause, but sometimes as proximate and sometimes as remote.

Quodcunque singulare sive quaevis res finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum et sic in infinitum. 

Translated as,

Whatsoever singular or whatever thing is finite and has a determinate existence is not able to exist nor be determined to an outcome unless it be determined to exist and produce an outcome from another cause which is finite and has a determinate existence and again this cause is also not able to exist nor be determined to produce an outcome unless it too is determined to exist and produce an outcome by another which is finite and has a determinate existence and so on to infinity.

Demonstratio: Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (per propositionem 26 et per corollarium propositionis 24). At id quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi produci non potuit; quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attribut sequitur, id infinitum et aeternum est (per propositionem 21). Debuit ergo ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo sequi quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; praeter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (per axioma 1 et definitionibus 3 et 5) et modi (per corollarium ropositionis 25) nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus affectum est modificatione quae aeterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (per propositionem 22). Debuit ergo sequi vel ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus modificatum est modificatione quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum. Deinde haec rursus causa sive hic modus (per eandem rationem qua primam partem huius jam jam demonstravimus) debuit etiam determinari ab alia quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec ultima (per eandem rationem) ab alia et sic semper (per eandem rationem) in infinitum. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Whatever has been determined to exist and produce an outcome, has been determined in this way by God (by P26 and P24C). But what is finite and has a determinate existence has not been able to be produced by the absolute nature of some attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, is an infinite and eternal thing (by P21). It must, therefore, follow either from God or from some attribute of God insofar as it is considered to be affected by some mode. For there is nothing except substance and its modes (by A1, D3 and D5) and modes (by P25C) are nothing but modifications of God's attributes. But it also has not been able to follow from God, or from some attribute of God, insofar as it is affected by a measuring which is eternal and infinite (by P22). It must, therefore, follow from, or be determined to exist and produce an outcome by God or some attribute of God insofar as it is measured by a measuring which is finite and has a determinate existence. This was the first thing to be proven. Next in turn, this cause or this mode (by the same reasoning by which we have already demonstrated the first part of this proposition) must also be determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this last (by the same reasoning) by another, and so always (by the same reasoning) to infinity.

Scholium: Cum quaedam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt videlicet ea quae ex absoluta ejus natura necessario sequuntur et alia mediantibus his primis quae tamen sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt, hinc sequitur I: quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima, non vero in suo genere aiunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (per propositionem 15 et corollarium propositionis 24). Sequitur II: quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium nisi forte ea de causa ut scilicet has ab iis quas immediate produxit vel potius quae ex absoluta ejus natura sequuntur, distinguamus. Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus quae cum effectu nullo modo conjuncta est. At omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint. 

Translated as,

Since certain things must have been produced by God immediately, that is those which follow necessarily from its absolute nature and others by mediation of these first things - which nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God had to be produced by the mediation of these first things, it follows: I. because God is absolutely the proximate cause of things produced immediately by itself and not indeed "in its own kind" as they say. For God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause (by P15 and P24C). II. because God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, unless perhaps from that cause so that we may distinguish them from those which [God] has produced immediately or rather which follow from its absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one which is not conjoined in any way with its effect. But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be conceived without it.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P27: A Thing Is Determined

This proposition appears to emphasize the location and limit of power. God does not have the power to grant that a res or "thing" be endowed with the power of rendering itself indeterminata or "undetermined". Infinitely infinite power lacks this power which would be akin to substance creating another substance.

Res quae a Deo ad aliquid operandum determinata est, se ipsam indeterminatam reddere non potest. 

Translated as,

A thing which has been determined by God to produce an outcome, cannot return itself to undetermined.

Demonstratio: Haec propositio patet ex axiomate tertio.

Translated as

This proposition is evident from A3.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P26: Determined By God

Here Spinoza continues to relentlessly demonstrate that its "all God all the time." No room for a separate causal power exists. Our perceptions of independence of power are simply cognitive illusions.

Res quae ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata et quae a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare. 

Translated as,

A thing which has been determined to produce an outcome has necessarily been determined in this way by God and one which has not been determined by God, is not able to determine itself to produce an outcome.

Demonstratio: Id per quod res determinatae ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario quid positivum est (ut per se notum). Adeoque tam ejus essentiae quam existentiae Deus ex necessitate suae naturae est causa efficiens (per propositiones 25 et 16) quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam quod secundo proponitur clarissime sequitur. Nam si res quae a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars falsa esset, quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.

Translated as,

That by which things are said to be determined to produce an outcome, necessarily such a thing is substantive (as it is known through itself). To such an extent, God, from the necessity of its own nature, is the efficient cause just as much of a thing's essence as of a thing's existence (by P25 and 16). This was the first thing. And from which it follows most clearly what was proposed next. For if a thing which has not been determined by God were able to determine itself, the first part of this [proposition] would be false, which is absurd, as we have shown.