Spinoza's Ethics: II.P13: Object of The Mind

This proposition, at first study, seems to contradict the parallel structure of II.P7 because it appears to give priority to the body in a cause-effect framework. However, this proposition actually informs the parallel structure. Ideas, as discussed in earlier propositions, are either representative or non-representative. The physical or extending aspect and the subjective or thinking aspect are each causally connected within their respective attributes but are based within a mode or modification of substance. As the physical mode of an individual emerges, so too does the subjective mode emerge. Yet, the subjective mode does not emerge as a "tabula rasa" as some were to claim. Instead, the subjective mode emerges with the idea of the body. This "idea of the body" is difficult for us to understand because of our simple and abstraction notions related to idea. Instead, for Spinoza, an idea can be complex with as many components to an idea as there are components in a body. Thus, the "idea of the body" is made of representative and non-representative ideas. 

In his demonstration, Spinoza poses two situations that would exist if the body were not the object of the mind. The first describes a situation in which subjectivity would exist through other bodies but not our own. If that were the case, we would record the experience of other objects and not our own experience. He then describes a different situation is which we experience the subjectivity of something else as well as our own. He states that this clearly does not occur - although we experience empathy with others. It does point to God as thinking thing and how utterly unattainable the experience of multiple and disparate sensations might be experienced. Perhaps this could be conceptualized as a form of "pain."

As usual, his scholium raises interesting issues. He asserts that the union of the mind and the body are completely common and applicable to all enlivened creatures. Thus, Spinoza has no doubt about the existence of a mind of a plant or animal different than humans. The presence of a mind in terms of what we call inanimate would be subject to a definition of "enlivened." Perhaps the coordinations of the atmosphere provide an opportunity to expand "enlivened" to the planet. He does not differentiate or further define in the direction of "enlivened," but rather moves in the direction of "reality" or "excellence" which are defined in a variety of ways including functionality, multi-tasking and independence. Thus a comparison of stone, virus, bacterium, plant, animal and human would be on this spectrum - a spectrum which excludes nothing. In this physical scale, there is a parallel mental scale. The idea that as functionality increases, more "of reality" increases seems to rely on underlying notions of power. Also fascinating is that his mental distinctions are more based on interspecies distinctions here as opposed to concepts that we might term IQ. In this sense, Spinoza is quite egalitarian about treatment of the human mind. 

Objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis est corpus sive certus extensionis modus actu existens et nihil aliud.

Translated as,

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim corpus non esset humanæ mentis objectum, ideæ affectionum corporis non essent in Deo (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) quatenus mentem nostram sed quatenus alterius rei mentem constitueret hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) ideæ affectionum corporis non essent in nostra mente; atqui (per axioma 4 hujus) ideas affectionum corporis habemus. Ergo objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis est corpus idque (per propositionem 11 hujus) actu existens. Deinde si præter corpus etiam aliud esset mentis objectum, cum nihil (per propositionem 36 partis I) existat ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet (per propositionem 12 hujus) necessario alicujus ejus effectus idea in mente nostra dari; atqui (per axioma 5 hujus) nulla ejus idea datur. Ergo objectum nostræ mentis est corpus existens et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For if the body is not the object of the human mind, the ideas of impacts of the body are not in God (by IIP9C) insofar as our our mind but it [God] constitutes the mind of another thing, that is, (by IIP11C) the ideas of the impacts of the body are not in our mind, and yet (by IIA4) we have ideas of the impacts of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body and it (by IIP11) is actually existing. Next, if besides the body there is still another object of the mind, since nothing (by IP36) exists from which another effect does not follow, the effect of something else ought (by IIP12) to be given necessarily in our mind by an idea and yet (by IIA5) no idea of it is given. Thus, the object of our mind is the existing body and nothing else.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur hominem mente et corpore constare et corpus humanum prout ipsum sentimus existere.

Translated as,

From this, it follows that a human is composed of the mind and body and that the body of humans exists just as we feel itself.

SCHOLIUM: Ex his non tantum intelligimus mentem humanam unitam esse corpori sed etiam quid per mentis et corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adæquate sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit nisi prius nostri corporis naturam adæquate cognoscat. Nam ea quæ hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt nec magis ad homines quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quæ omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt. Nam cujuscunque rei datur necessario in Deo idea cujus Deus est causa eodem modo ac humani corporis ideæ atque adeo quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est. Attamen nec etiam negare possumus ideas inter se ut ipsa objecta differre unamque alia præstantiorem esse plusque realitatis continere prout objectum unius objecto alterius præstantius est plusque realitatis continet ac propterea ad determinandum quid mens humana reliquis intersit quidque reliquis præstet, necesse nobis est ejus objecti ut diximus hoc est corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum nec id ad ea quæ demonstrare volo, necesse est. Hoc tamen in genere dico quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo ejus mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo ejus mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum. Atque ex his præstantiam unius mentis præ aliis cognoscere possumus, deinde causam etiam videre cur nostri corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem et alia plura quæ in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operæ pretium esse duxi hæc ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est pauca de natura corporum præmittere.

Translated as,

From these [propositions] we not only know that the human mind is joined to the body, but also what ought to be known by the union of the mind and the body. Truly no one will be able to know the [mind] itself adequately and distinctly unless first that person adequately recognizes the nature of our body. For those things which we have shown up to this point, are completely common things and do not pertain more to humans than to any other individual [beings], which nevertheless are all enlivened by as many degrees as you like. For the idea of whatsoever thing is given necessarily in God of which God is the cause in the same way as the ideas of the human body to such a degree that whatever we have said about the idea of the human body, it must necessarily be said about the idea of whatsoever thing. And yet we are not even able to deny that ideas differ among themselves as objects themselves differ and that one be more excellent than others and contain more of reality just as the object of one is more excellent than the object of another and contains more of reality and for that reason to determine [in] what [way] the human mind differs from the others and [in] what [way] it excels over the others, it is necessary for us to get to know of its object, as we have said, that is the nature of the human body. Moreover I am unable to explain this [nature] here and it is not necessary for those things which I wish to show. Nevertheless in this kind I say in what way some body is more suitable than others for doing or working more things at the same time, where its mind is more suitable than others for perceiving more things at the same time and where the actions of one mind depend more on itself alone and where other bodies join less with the same in doing, where its mind is more suitable for knowing distinctly. And from these we are able to recognize the excellence of one mind before the others, next to even see why the cause of our body, not unless we might have a completely confused understanding, and more other things which I deduce in order from these things. Concerning which cause to be the price of works I have arranged these things to accurately explain and show them, for which it is necessary to show a few things concerning the nature of bodies.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P12: Perception

Spinoza is outlining how things occur objectively and are viewed subjectively. This challenge exists in psychology and psychiatry today within the so called mind-body problem. For example, the framework for dynamics between cognitive therapy and drug therapy elude scientists. Here Spinoza provides an outline of how the mind perceives. The first part is to articulate the nature of the idea that constitutes the mind. Here he provides an example with the body. He uses the term by necessity, which as I pointed out earlier, refers to a causal state that requires something. Clearly, for a mind to exist, the related body must exist. Thus, in Spinoza's terms, the mind is connected to the body by necessity. Further, when such a relationship exists, he shows that a change or affectus must be considered. I have discussed the critical role that this non-representational mode of thinking plays within Spinoza's framework.

Another example here is the role that accounting plays with its object as the actual business. Accounting attempts to capture business reality, but often misinterprets. Sometimes these misinterpretations impact the business reality - as in capital formation. At times, it appears that Spinoza's strict attributal distinction do not allow for causality of the mind on the body and vice versa. However, that is clearly only the case at the level of God, where completely adequate ideas accompany extending things. On a human level, a interactive dynamic like this accounting example does set up.

Quicquid in objecto ideæ humanam mentem constituentis contingit, id ab humana mente debet percipi sive ejus rei dabitur in mente necessario idea hoc est si objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis sit corpus, nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere quod a mente non percipiatur.

Translated as,

Whatever happens in the object of an idea constituting a human mind, that [occurrence] ought to be perceived by a human mind or the idea of that matter [occurrence] is given in the mind by necessity, that is, if the object of the idea constituting a human mind is a body, nothing is able to happen in this body which is not perceived by the mind.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid enim in objecto cujuscunque ideæ contingit, ejus rei datur necessario in Deo cognitio (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) quatenus ejusdem objecti idea affectus consideratur hoc est (per propositionem 11 hujus) quatenus mentem alicujus rei constituit. Quicquid igitur in objecto ideæ humanam mentem constituentis contingit, ejus datur necessario in Deo cognitio quatenus naturam humanæ mentis constituit hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) ejus rei cognitio erit necessario in mente sive mens id percipit. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For whatever happens in the object of whatsoever idea, an understanding of that matter [occurrence] is given in God by necessity (by IIP9C) insofar as through the idea of the same object, a change is considered, that is (by IIP11) insofar as it [idea] constitutes the mind of something. Thus, whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting a human mind, an understanding of that matter [occurrence] is given in God by necessity, that is (by IIP11C), the understanding of that thing will exist in the mind by necessity or the mind perceives it.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc propositio patet etiam et clarius intelligitur ex scholio propositionis 7 hujus, quod vide. 

Translated as,

This proposition is especially understood clearly from IIP7S, which you should view.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P11: Essence of a Human Mind

Spinoza's scholium reveals his awareness that this section is difficult to understand. In the prior proposition, he addresses the essence of a human as modal and not substantial. Given his earlier propositions, this modal essence manifests equally within attributes of existing and thinking. The modal manifestations are clear: a human body and a human mind. Insofar as these modes don't exist, they are simply formal or virtual (in my words). But existence changes all of that. The essence of an existing human body is (yet to be discussed but will ultimately be given) conatus. The essence of an existing human mind is a singular idea of an existing singular thing that is both prior by nature and adequate. Both existing modes are connected together within their respective attributes by the power of God's expressiveness. Conatus is a human body's modal expressiveness, while adequacy is a human mind's modal expressiveness. The power of the human mind's expressiveness can be weakened by inadequate ideas. This is briefly highlighted at the end of this corollary.  

Primum quod actuale mentis humanæ esse constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea rei alicujus singularis actu existentis.

Translated as,

The first thing which constitutes the actual essence of a human mind is nothing other than the idea of a singular thing in actual existence.

DEMONSTRATIO: Essentia hominis (per corollarium præcedentis propositionis) a certis Dei attributorum modis constituitur nempe (per axioma 2 hujus) a modis cogitandi quorum omnium (per axioma 3 hujus) idea natura prior est et ea data reliqui modi (quibus scilicet idea natura prior est) in eodem debent esse individuo (per axioma 3 hujus). Atque adeo idea primum est quod humanæ mentis esse constituit. At non idea rei non existentis. Nam tum (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus) ipsa idea non potest dici existere; erit ergo idea rei actu existentis. At non rei infinitæ. Res namque infinita (per propositiones 21 et 22 partis I) debet semper necessario existere; atqui hoc (per axioma 1 hujus) est absurdum; ergo primum quod esse humanæ mentis actuale constituit, est idea rei singularis actu existentis. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The essence of a human (by IIP10C) is constituted by certain modes of attributes of God, indeed (by IIA2) by modes of thinking whose idea of everything (by IIA3) is prior by nature and, [the idea] having been given, the remaining modes (by which of course the idea is prior by nature) must be in the same individual (by IIA3). And to such a degree the idea at first is what constitutes the essence of a human mind. But not the idea of a thing not existing. For then (by IIP8C) the idea itself is not able to be said to exist; it will therefore be the idea of a thing existing in actuality. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (by IP21 and IP22) ought to exist by necessity. And this (by IIA1) is absurd. Therefore at first which constitutes the actual essence of a human mind is the idea of a singular thing in actual existence.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei ac proinde cum dicimus mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod Deus non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus per naturam humanæ mentis explicatur sive quatenus humanæ mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habet ideam et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel illam ideam habere non tantum quatenus naturam humanæ mentis constituit sed quatenus simul cum mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam, tum dicimus mentem humanam rem ex parte sive inadæquate percipere.

Translated as,

From here it follows that a human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God and next when we say that a human mind perceives this or that, we say nothing other than that God, not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it is explained by the nature of the human mind or insofar as it constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea and when we say that God has this or that idea not so much insofar as it constitutes the nature of the human mind but insofar as at the same time it even has the idea of another thing with a human mind, then we say that a human mind perceives a thing partially or inadequately.

SCHOLIUM: Hic sine dubio lectores hærebunt multaque comminiscentur quæ moram injiciant et hac de causa ipsos rogo ut lento gradu mecum pergant nec de his judicium ferant donec omnia perlegerint.

Translated as,

Here without a doubt readers will be stuck and confuse many things which inject a delay and for this reason I ask these same [readers] that they proceed with me by a slow step and not make a judgment concerning these things as long as they are reading everything to the end.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P10: Essence of A Human

The first thing to understand about this proposition is that Latin is notoriously challenged by a lack of a definite or indefinite article. As a result, this proposition is often translated generically, but given Latin's vagueness and Spinoza's focus on singularity, I think it appropriate to be specific. The essence of God does not pertain to a specific human, rather than to humankind as most translators render it.

In the demonstration, Spinoza builds on the understanding that the essence of substance is existence. Here he refers to necessary existence. In this, he argues that a human clearly does not qualify. Of course, a human can and does exist. Yet Spinoza argues that such existence is not necessary. This necessity is different than our common understanding because Spinoza is not referring to a necessity that is compelled from the outside. In this, a human existence may actually be understood as necessary. Rather, Spinoza is discussing necessary as that without which nothing else functions. The necessity of substance is that nothing else functions without it; here a human is easily understood as unnecessary.

In the scholium, Spinoza moves from the essence of a human to the form of a human. By doing so, Spinoza equates the form of a human to the essence of a human. The essence of a human, then, is unrelated to its existence but is a formal singularity.

In the corollary, Spinoza connects the essence of a human or the formal singularity to a specific modification of substance. In the connected demonstration, he describes this specific modification as in God and unable to be without God. For understanding (although there are some limits here), I think of how waves function within the ocean. Waves are in and of the ocean and are certainly singular, but yet they do not form the essence or necessary existence of the ocean.

Finally, Spinoza embarks on a difficult scholium. In this scholium he takes aim at two arguments which are inconsistent among themselves. The first argument is that the essence of a human pertains to the essence of God. In this Spinoza is simply focused on the logic that God can and does exist without a human but the converse is not true. The second argument is the essence of a human can exist without God. For Spinoza this is clearly flawed. But the argument does get more laborious. In his argumentation, Spinoza does clearly establish a couple of things. One, a human is nothing more than what a friend of mine says "a pimple on God's butt." Second, modifications of substance are what substance or God does. It appears that while modifications themselves are transitory that modifying substance is the core of God's expressiveness and thus, modifying is fundamental to existence. Modifications come from modifying but modifying doesn't come from somewhere. Instead, modifying is the essence of substance.

Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiæ sive substantia formam hominis non constituit.

Translated as,

It does not pertain to the essence of a human to be of [the essence of] substance or substance does not constitute the form of a human.

DEMONSTRATIO: Esse enim substantiæ involvit necessariam existentiam (per propositionem 7 partis I). Si igitur ad hominis essentiam pertineret esse substantiæ, data ergo substantia, daretur necessario homo (per definitionem 2 hujus) et consequenter homo necessario existeret, quod (per axioma 1 hujus) est absurdum. Ergo etc. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For to be of [the essence of] substance involves necessary existence (by IP7). So if it were to pertain to the essence of a human to be of [the essence of] substance, then when substance is given, a human would necessarily be given (by IID2) and consequently a human would necessarily exist, which (by IIA1) is absurd. Therefore, etc. 

SCHOLIUM: Demonstratur etiam hæc propositio ex propositione 5 partis I nempe quod duæ ejusdem naturæ substantiæ non dentur. Cum autem plures homines existere possint, ergo id quod hominis formam constituit, non est esse substantiæ. Patet præterea hæc propositio ex reliquis substantiæ proprietatibus videlicet quod substantia sit sua natura infinita, immutabilis, indivisibilis etc. ut facile unusquisque videre potest.

Translated as,

So this proposition is shown from IP5 of course since two substances of the same nature may not be given. Since moreover more humans are able to exist, thus that which constitutes the form of a human is not able to be of [the essence of] substance. It is clear on account of this proposition from the other properties of substance just as because substance is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible etc. so that one is able to easily see it as unique.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur essentiam hominis constitui a certis Dei attributorum modificationibus.

Translated as,

From this it follows that the essence of a human is constituted by certain modifications of attributes of God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam esse substantiæ (per propositionem præcedentem) ad essentiam hominis non pertinet. Est ergo (per propositionem 15 partis I) aliquid quod in Deo est et quod sine Deo nec esse nec concipi potest sive (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I) affectio sive modus qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimit.

Translated as,

For to be of [the essence] of substance (by IIP10) does not pertain to the essence of a human. Thus it is (by IP15) whatever which is in God and which can neither be nor be conceived without God (by IP25C) is a modification or mode which expresses the nature of God in a certain and determinate way.

SCHOLIUM: Omnes sane concedere debent nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est quod Deus omnium rerum tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ unica est causa hoc est Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri ut aiunt sed etiam secundum esse. At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere dicunt sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt vel quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cujus rei causam fuisse credo quod ordinem philosophandi non tenuerint. Nam naturam divinam quam ante omnia contemplari debebant quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam et res quæ sensuum objecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt; unde factum est ut dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint quam de divina natura et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint quam de primis suis figmentis quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant; utpote quæ ad cognitionem divinæ naturæ nihil juvare poterant adeoque nihil mirum si sibi passim contradixerint. Sed hoc mitto. Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit causam reddere cur non dixerim id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; nimirum quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet sed id necessario essentiam alicujus rei constituere dixi quo dato, res ponitur et quo sublato, res tollitur vel id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.

Translated as,

Everyone ought to sanely concede that nothing is able to be or be conceived without God. For all are in agreement that God is the unique cause of all things just as much of their essence as of their existence, that is, God is not only the cause of things according to their happening as they say but also according to their existing. But meanwhile most say that it pertains to the essence of something without which a thing is able to neither be nor be conceived to such a degree that they believe that either the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things or that created things are able to be or be conceived without God or what is more certain, they are not consistent enough for themselves. I believe that the cause of which thing has been that they have not held the order for philosophizing. For the divine nature, which is before all things, they ought to have contemplated [first] because it is prior as much by cognition as by nature, [this divine nature] they have believed that it is final by order of cognition and that things are prior (to everything else) which are called objects of feelings. From where it is a fact that as long as natural things are contemplated, about nothing have they thought less than about divine nature and since after they named the spirit for contemplating divine nature, about nothing less have they been able to think than about their own first fictions by which they have build out an understanding of natural things. In as much as which things are able to help nothing for the understanding of divine nature to such an extent that nothing is a wonder if they contradict themselves throughout. But I dismiss this. For my only intention here was to give the cause why I did not speak about what pertains to the essence of whatever thing without which a thing is able to neither be nor be conceived; no doubt because singular things are not able to be nor be conceived without God and nevertheless God does not pertain to the essence of things but I have said that it necessarily constitutes the essence of each thing by which given, the thing is placed and by which removed, the thing is removed or that without which the thing is and vice versa that which without which thing the thing is neither able to be nor be conceived.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P9: Actual Things

Here Spinoza further explores the relationship of the term affectus or "affect" to idea which was introduced in II.A3. In some ways, this confirms the notion that Spinoza's sense of idea typically relates to our everyday notion of "feeling." In discussing the mind, Spinoza does not delineate between thought and feelings, but instead argues that thought and feelings are both parts on a continuum within the mind which are all characterized by the word idea. Spinoza's delineation is between the mind and the brain - roughly describing the subjective and objective.

Yet when the discussion is involving the mind of God as opposed to the mind of a human being affectus or "affect" is still within the subjectivity of the thinking thing, but it simply refers to a variation. Affectus in this sense does not carry the everyday notion of "feeling" but more of a notion of "change." 

In Spinoza's demonstration, there is additional emphasis on the connectivity of ideas as indicated by affect. Spinoza makes a wording difference here from the wording in II.P7. He states that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of "causes," rather than using the word "things." This indicates that the things of II.P7 are the underlying modes and not a reference to the bodies that are the modal expressions of God as extending thing. This is important because readers often stumble at the concept of tying together the modal expressions of extending and thinking in a strict parallelism. Instead, the tying together is with the actual modes of substance and the modes expressed within its respective attribute.

In the corollary, Spinoza continues to distinguish the actual or real in God. The importance of this is because the nature of idea, especially as its application expands to feelings, is its imprecision. As the idea is in God, it is real or actual. This corollary is building that framework. Spinoza rarely adds a demonstration of a corollary. He does so here to secure the importance and definition of "in God" as through another singular thing. This, again, is significant and is understandable by reflecting on how we assert that we cannot argue about someone's feelings, because the experience of those feelings are true for the subject. However, we do argue that the object of those feelings are easily distorted by the limitations of perception. Thus, the respect that we give to someone's feelings (as opposed to their perceptions) is grounded in the sense that such thoughts are "in God."

Idea rei singularis actu existentis Deum pro causa habet non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur cujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alia tertia affectus est et sic in infinitum.

Translated as,

The idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing has God as cause not insofar as it is infinite but insofar as another idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing is considered an affect of which also God is the cause insofar as another third [idea] [is considered] an affect and so on into infinity.

Demonstratio: Idea rei singularis actu existentis modus singularis cogitandi est et a reliquis distinctus (per corollarium et scholium propositionis 8 hujus) adeoque (per propositionem 6 hujus) Deum quatenus est tantum res cogitans, pro causa habet. At non (per propositionem 28 partis I) quatenus est res absolute cogitans sed quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur et hujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus est et sic in infinitum. Atqui ordo et connexio idearum (per propositionem 7 hujus) idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum; ergo unius singularis ideæ alia idea sive Deus quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur, est causa et hujus etiam quatenus alia affectus est et sic in infinitum. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing is a mode of singular thinking and distinct from remaining things (by IIP8C and IIP8S) to the extent (IIP6) that it has God as cause insofar as it is only a thinking thing. But not (by IP28) insofar as it is absolutely a thinking thing but insofar as it is considered an affect by another mode of thinking and of which also God is the cause insofar as it is the affect by another mode of thinking and so on into infinity. And the order and connection of ideas (by IIP7) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Thus, another idea of a unique singular idea or God insofar as [it is] another idea is considered an affect is the cause and of which also insofar as another [idea] is the affect and so on into infinity.

Corollarium: Quicquid in singulari cujuscunque ideæ objecto contingit, ejus datur in Deo cognitio quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti ideam habet.

Translated as,

Whatever touches on the singular object of whatsoever idea, the thought of it is given in God insofar as it has only the idea of the same object.

Demonstratio: Quicquid in objecto cujuscunque ideæ contingit, ejus datur in Deo idea (per propositionem 3 hujus) non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur (per præcedentem propositionem) sed (per propositionem 7 hujus) ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum; erit ergo cognitio ejus quod in singulari aliquo objecto contingit, in Deo quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti habet ideam. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Whatever touches on the object of whatever idea, the idea of it [whatever touches] is given in God (by IIP3) not insofar as it is infinite but insofar as another idea of a singular thing is considered an affect (by IIP8) but (IIP7) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; it will be therefore the thought of it which touches on any object of a singular thing, in God insofar as it only has the idea of the same object.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P8: Ideas That Do Not Exist

This proposition addresses the intuition that there must be ideas of singular things which actually don't exist. If II.P7 is correct and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, then what is the meaning of ideas that do not exist? Here Spinoza says that ideas of singular things which do not exist are in God's infinite idea as formal essences. 

Ideæ rerum singularium sive modorum non existentium ita debent comprehendi in Dei infinita idea ac rerum singularium sive modorum essentiæ formales in Dei attributis continentur.

Translated as,

The ideas of singular things or modes that do not exist ought to be comprehended in the infinite idea of God as the formal essences of singular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Demonstratio: Hæc propositio patet ex præcedenti sed intelligitur clarius ex præcedenti scholio.

Translated as,

This proposition is clear from the preceding [proposition] but is more clearly understood from the preceding scholium.

Corollarium: Hinc sequitur quod quamdiu res singulares non existunt nisi quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, earum esse objectivum sive ideæ non existunt nisi quatenus infinita Dei idea existit et ubi res singulares dicuntur existere non tantum quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur sed quatenus etiam durare dicuntur, earum ideæ etiam existentiam per quam durare dicuntur, involvent.

Translated as,

From this it follows because as long as singular things do not exist unless insofar as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, the objective essence or ideas of [these singular things] do not exist unless insofar as the infinite idea of God exists and when singular things are said to exist not only insofar as they are comprehended in the attributes of God but insofar are they are said to last, the ideas of [these singular things] involve even existence through which they are said to last.

Scholium: Si quis ad uberiorem hujus rei explicationem exemplum desideret, nullum sane dare potero quod rem de qua hic loquor, utpote unicam adæquate explicet; conabor tamen rem ut fieri potest, illustrare. Nempe circulus talis est naturæ ut omnium linearum rectarum in eodem sese invicem secantium rectangula sub segmentis sint inter se æqualia; quare in circulo infinita inter se æqualia rectangula continentur : attamen nullum eorum potest dici existere nisi quatenus circulus existit nec etiam alicujus horum rectangulorum idea potest dici existere nisi quatenus in circuli idea comprehenditur. Concipiantur jam ex infinitis illis duo tantum nempe E et D existere. Sane eorum etiam ideæ jam non tantum existunt quatenus solummodo in circuli idea comprehenduntur sed etiam quatenus illorum rectangulorum existentiam involvunt, quo fit ut a reliquis reliquorum rectangulorum ideis distinguantur. 

Translated as,

If anyone might desire an example for a more fruitful explanation of this matter, I will be able to give no clear one on the matter about which I speak here, in as much as [the matter] shows up adequately unique. Nevertheless I will try to illustrate the matter so that it might become [clear]. Of course such a circle is of nature so that of all of the straight lines are in the same circle itself in turns cutting up rectangles that are under segments equal among themselves. Thus, in a circle there are infinite equal rectangles contained within itself. Nevertheless not one of them is able to be said to exist unless insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Already they are conceived from those infinite [segments] only two - namely E and D - exist. Clearly the ideas of them also do not only exist insofar as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve the existence of those rectangles, by which it happens that they might be distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P7: Order and Connection

This proposition is important to thoroughly understand. As discussed in earlier posts on Book II, Spinoza is presenting reality through two aspects. It is tempting to simply connect a series of events that occur within the physical world to establish a series of events within the mental world, but that demeans the unique nature of each attribute. For example, lightening and thunder are related to the same event. However, lightening occurs with a different timing than thunder because the speed of light waves are different than those of sound waves. To say that the lightening caused the thunder is to misattribute cause. They are both caused by the same underlying phenomenon. Similarly, the order and connection of ideas and things are prone to differences given the defining characteristics of each attribute. For example, within the attribute of thinking are modes of thought such as affects that do not have a representational object, but yet have a related causal event within the attribute of extending.

That warning aside, Spinoza sets out a proposition that ensures a movement towards an "active" intellect by focusing causality on the subjective experiences rather than the objective events. His framework for understanding reality drives a different process for addressing mental states. When confronted with a feeling or mental state, most individuals highlight a particular person or event as the cause. Spinoza is stating that the person or event is not the cause, instead the cause is the idea of the person or the event. This idea is frequently incorrect, or in his terms, inadequate. Given the inadequacy of the idea, the likelihood is high that the feeling or mental state experienced is in error - despite our best observation. In the same way that we perceive that lightening creates subsequent thunder, so too are we inclined to incorrectly attribute cause and blame.

Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.

Translated as,

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Demonstratio: Patet ex axiomate 4 partis I. Nam cujuscunque causati idea a cognitione causæ cujus est effectus, dependet.

Translated as,

It is evident from IA4. For the idea of whatsoever is caused is governed by the knowledge of which cause it is the effect.

Corollarium: Hinc sequitur quod Dei cogitandi potentia æqualis est ipsius actuali agendi potentiæ. Hoc est quicquid ex infinita Dei natura sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei idea eodem ordine eademque connexione sequitur in Deo objective.

Translated as,

From this it follows that the power of God's thinking is the equivalent of the power of [God's] actual doing. That is, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, every ["whatever"] follows from the idea of God in the same order and the same connection as an object in God.

Scholium: Hic antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id quod supra ostendimus nempe quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam substantiæ essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia quæ jam sub hoc jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res sed duobus modis expressa, quod quidam Hebræorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt Deum, Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Exempli gratia circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis quæ etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res quæ per diversa attributa explicatur et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis sive sub attributo cogitationis sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus. Nec ulla alia de causa dixi quod Deus sit causa ideæ exempli gratia circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa nisi quia esse formale ideæ circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum tanquam causam proximam et ille iterum per alium et sic in infinitum, potest percipi ita ut quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturæ sive causarum connexionem per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturæ per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet et idem de aliis attributis intelligo. Quare rerum ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa quatenus infinitis constat attributis nec impræsentiarum hæc clarius possum explicare.

Translated as,

Before we might move further, we ought to recall to memory that which we have shown above, namely that whatever may be perceived from infinite intellect as if constituting the essence of substance, every such ["whatever"] pertains to the one and only substance to such a degree that, as a consequence, thinking substance and extending substance are one and the same substance which is comprehended either now under this or now under that attribute. Thus, the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are indeed one and the same thing but expressed under two modes, which certain of the Hebrews seemed to have seen as if through a cloud, who evidently determined that God, the intellect of God and things from the [intellect of God] itself are one and the same thing. For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of a circle existing which is truly in God are one and the same thing which is explained through different attributes and to the extent we conceive nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under some other [attribute], we discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes that is, the same things follow in order. And I have not said any other things about cause where God might be the cause of an idea, for example, [the cause] of the circle insofar as [God] is only a thinking thing and [the cause] of the circle insofar as [God] is only an extending thing (unless since it is the formal essence of the idea of a circle) is not able to be perceived unless by thinking of another mode as its proximate cause and that again through another to infinity, so that for as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we ought to explain the order of all of nature or the connection of causes by only the attribute of thought and insofar as the modes of extension are considered, also the order of all of nature ought to be explained by only the attribute of extension and I understand the same of other attributes. Therefore of things as they are in themselves, God in truth is the cause insofar as [God] consists of infinite attributes and I am not able to explain these more clearly for the present.